Descriptive Representation on K Street: Race and Gender Among Federal Lobbyists

Abstract

Government released data indicate substantial racial and gender gaps among lobbyists in recent years. These gender and racial differences are also greater among conservative leaning groups. However, we show, these gaps are decreasing over time. Does demand for minority and female lobbyists play a role in these trends? Although previous work has highlighted the relative scarcity of women and minorities in positions leading to the lobbyist profession (supply), we know less about whether interest groups are interested in hiring qualified women and minorities for such positions (demand). Using a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of individuals involved in hiring lobbyists, we find greater demand for female and minority lobbyists than for their male and white counterparts, especially among ideological liberals. Our work shows that the lobbying industry does not appear to discount the candidacies of potential female and minority lobbyists.

Abstract Word Count: 141
Word Count: 9,924

Ain't but two of us. One Democrat, one Republican.
—Fred McClure of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, when asked how many African-American lobbyists there are (Birnbaum 2006)

It is very challenging. It is still a boys' club out there.
—Karissa Willhite, principal at Ogilvy (Gangitano 2020)

Women and minorities are underrepresented as federal policymakers. They are less likely to hold public office (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Schaeffer 2021), to hold senior positions as congressional staffers (Ritchie and You 2021; Ziniel 2021), and are underrepresented in the federal bureaucracy (Bishu and Headley 2020; Naff 1998; Potter and Volden 2018). Yet, while evaluations of policy responsiveness and representation have focused almost exclusively on the role of those in government, many non-governmental actors also play an active and important role in the policy process. In particular, substantial evidence demonstrates the important role that lobbyists play in the development (Baumgartner et al. 2009), passage (Hall and Deardorff 2006), and implementation (Yackee 2006) of public policy.

Moreover, while lobbyists act for the organized interests they represent, they also enjoy an information advantage over those groups and often have substantial agency regarding the specific actions they take to promote policies and shape legislation (Holyoke 2021; LaPira and Thomas 2014, 2017; Leech 2014; Schiff et al. 2015; Stephenson and Jackson 2010). As such, the identity of the lobbyist can have real effects on policy outcomes (Levine 2009). In particular, previous work has shown that male and female lobbyists act to shape the policy process in different ways (Lucas and Hyde 2012; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Schlozman 1990) and shapes the substantive policy representation of minorities and women more broadly (Nownes and Freeman 1998; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990; Strickland and Stauffer 2022).

In this paper, we first examine the representation of women and minorities among the ranks of federal lobbyists using data on lobbyists from the Lobbyist Disclosure Act reports

filed between 2001 and 2020. We confirm previous evidence suggesting minorities and women are underrepresented among lobbyists.[1] In addition to documenting the underrepresentation of particular groups among lobbyists, we also show that these gaps have declined over recent years. Minorities and women represented four percent and 37 percent of lobbyists in 2001, respectively, they represent eight and 42 percent in more recent years. However, there are also substantial differences across groups. Drawing on new data of ideological placement of 1,400 organized groups that employ lobbyists, we show that this underrepresentation is starkest among organizations on the right of the ideological spectrum.

Second, and more consequentially, we examine the demand for women and minorities as lobbyists. Specifically, we ask whether demand for women and minorities among those involved in hiring lobbyists helps advance the trend we see towards greater diversity or whether this trend occurs in spite of discriminatory hiring preferences? Although some previous work has documented the lack of diversity among the professions that feed into lobbying (i.e. the lack of supply of potential female and minority lobbyists), we do not know whether the underrepresentation of women and minorities and women within lobbying organizations is mitigated (or alternatively exacerbated) by the demand (or reduced demand) for female and minority lobbyists in the hiring process.[2]

Moreover, previous work does not provide clear expectations about whether we should expect greater or lesser demand among organized interests for minority and women lobbyists.

[1]While previous work has regularly provided updates on gender disparities among lobbyists (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990; Strickland and Stauffer 2022), there is less information on racial diversity among lobbyists at the federal level. Specifically, LaPira and Thomas (2017, 52) suggest that 10% of of *lobbyist surnames* were of Asian, African, or Hispanic origin, and a Public Affairs Council Survey conducted in 2021 indicated that 17% of public affairs professionals (a community that is broader than just registered lobbyists) were non-white (Horsley 2021). Similarly Strickland and Tarr (2023) indicate that 6% of lobbyists at the state level were minorities in 2009.

[2]Women and minorities are substantially underrepresented in many of the positions that give individuals the expertise and connections that qualify them for lobbying positions including elected officials (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Women Donors Network 2014), congressional staffers (Brenson 2020; Burgat 2017) and federal bureaucrats in leadership positions (Cornwell and Kellough 1994; Potter and Volden 2018), political campaign staffers (Chewning et al. 2022; Enos and Hersh 2015) and even lawyers (American Bar Association 2020). However, underrepresented minorities may be even less likely to enter lobbying from these professions. For example, Black former state lawmakers do not become lobbyists as often as do other former state legislators (Strickland and Tarr 2023).

On the one hand, previous work suggests women receive fewer job interviews in male-dominated professions (Galos and Coppock 2023; Koch, D'Mello, and Sackett 2015), which matches the lobbying profession, and that people tend to hire and promote others that look like them (Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman 1998; Reskin 2000). However, other work suggests that political elites are interested in gender and racial diversification, especially among liberal policymakers (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Kitchens and Swers 2016; Thomsen 2015; Thomsen and Swers 2017). In particular, given the number of female lobbyists correlates with the number of female legislators (Strickland and Stauffer 2022), we might expect liberal groups to demand more women and minorities in efforts to be more effective at lobbying minority and female elected officials (most of whom are Democrats).

To examine the demand from interest groups for minority and women lobbyists we use a conjoint survey experiment of political elites with intimate knowledge of and experience with the lobbyist hiring process—federal lobbyists and policy advocates.[3] Our experiment simulates the hiring process by presenting respondents with job applicant profiles whose randomly-generated characteristics convey information about the applicants' expertise, connections, and partisanship/ideology and asking them to indicate which applicant they would prefer to interview.[4] Crucially, we also randomly assigned information about both the job applicant's gender and race. This empirical approach enables us to isolate the independent causal effects of lobbyists' gender and racial characteristics on hiring decisions and assess the relative magnitudes of those effects on the same scale as other attributes such as policy expertise and

[3]The experiment was pre-registered at [redacted]. However, in that pre-registration, we did not pre-register expectations for the effects of women and minorities on hiring preferences.

[4]As we discuss further below, while interest in interviewing candidates is regularly used as a measure of employment discrimination (e.g. Quillian et al. 2017), the interview stage is only one step in the hiring process and groups may express interest in interviewing a diverse set of candidates but not hiring those candidates. However, we note that in this exercise, respondents were only allowed to select one candidate to interview rather than many candidates, making this exercise more like a hiring process. Moreover, the interview stage is a key filter in the hiring process that shapes the final pool from which employers can select and discrimination at the interview stage is correlated with discrimination at the hiring stage (Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort 1996; Neumark 2018; Quillian, Lee, and Oliver 2020; Riach and Rich 2002).

connections to legislative policymakers through past employment history.

Our results show that the demand for women and minorities as lobbyists is strong, and, in many instances, interest groups appear to prefer to interview women and minorities over their otherwise similar white and male counterparts. Moreover, we find slightly greater preferences for minorities and women among liberal groups, and specifically that this slight discrepancy by ideology is not simply due to preferences for ideologically aligned candidates. While both women and minorities are underrepresented in federal lobbyist positions, our results indicate there is some potential for optimism for greater diversity among lobbyists, given the demand groups have for hiring such individuals.

Influence of Lobbying Diversity

Why should we care about the representation of minorities and women among registered lobbyists? The simple answer is that previous evidence, although mostly focused on elected officials (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Grose 2011), their staff (Grose 2011; Ziniel 2021) and bureaucrats (Bishu and Headley 2020; Ritchie and You 2021), suggests that the presence of women and minorities in the policymaking process has substantial effects on the policies that government ultimately produces (Haynie 2001; Keiser et al. 2002; Swers 2002), and the representation of their interests in policy (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Grose 2011; Lowande, Ritchie, and Lauterbach 2019).[5]

We have, however, good reason to expect that these effects would also transfer to lobbyists. Recent work indicates individual lobbyists have a significant influence on the policy process beyond the effects of the organized interest that employs their services (Furnas, Heaney, and LaPira 2019; Strickland 2020), and that groups perceive a variety of characteristics, including gender, to influence the effectiveness of lobbyists (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen

[5]For example, female and minority legislators are more likely to sponsor legislation (e.g. Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001; Swers 2002; Wolbrecht 2000), and participate in the legislative process more generally (e.g. Dodson 2006; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Grose 2011) around issues particularly relevant to their underrepresented group.

2012; McCrain 2018; Strickland and Stauffer 2022).

In addition, while abundant evidence exists that racial and gender differences among individuals holding government office affects policy framing and substance, there is also some limited evidence that indicates that racial and gender diversity affects the lobbying process. Specifically, male and female lobbyists differ in the strategies and tactics they employ, the policies they prefer, and their attitudes towards politics (Lucas and Hyde 2012; Schlozman 1990) and may be approached more frequently by public officials (Nownes and Freeman 1998).[6] Evidence from interviews with lobbyists also suggests that women and minorities involved in the lobbying world are more focused on particular issues and approach the policy process differently (Levine 2009; Schlozman 1990; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020). Moreover, previous work suggests that organized groups perceive differences in effectiveness of male and female lobbyists in different policy making environments and vary the types of lobbyists they seek accordingly (Strickland and Stauffer 2022; Strickland and Tarr 2023). In short, this work suggests that the racial and gender diversity among lobbyists can have significant impacts on the process and outcomes of policymaking.

Women and Minorities in Lobbying

In addition to extant work, scholarly and journalistic, speculating on how a diverse lobbying community would affect the means and substance of policy implementation at the federal level, previous studies suggest that women (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020) and minorities (Birnbaum 2006; Horsley 2021; Wolman and Thomas 1970) are underrepresented in the population of federal lobbyists.

What is less clear, however, is the extent to which interest group demand (or lack thereof) for minorities and women as lobbyists plays into the lack of diversity in the lobbying

[6]There is some indication that differences along some of these dimensions, in particular the tactics they employ, may be small as women have become more integrated into the lobbying community (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; Nownes and Freeman 1998).

community.[7] Most previous work has not considered demand, instead focusing on the lack of supply and, specifically, the extensively the racial and gender gaps in other key professions that feed into lobbying, including elected officials (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Women Donors Network 2014), congressional staffers in leadership positions (Brenson 2020; Burgat 2017), federal bureaucrats in leadership positions (Cornwell and Kellough 1994; Potter and Volden 2018), political campaign staffers (Chewning et al. 2022; Enos and Hersh 2015) and even lawyers (American Bar Association 2020).

In addition, potentially contributing to the lack of supply, previous work has indicated that individuals previously excluded from politics (i.e. women and minorities) have lower levels of political ambition (Dynes et al. 2021; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2014; Preece and Stoddard 2015), discount their abilities, and are less likely to believe they will have the support necessary to pursue positions of power (Butler and Preece 2016; Lawless and Fox 2004, 2010).[8] Simply, previous work suggests women and minorities are less likely to self-select into opportunities that would lead to a career as a lobbyist.

Even further potentially contributing to a lack of supply, there is some evidence that suggests that women and minorities select out of lobbying. Gender gaps among lobbyists are slightly, but not drastically, larger among lobbyists working for contract lobbying firms than among those who work in-house for an organization purportedly because of the differences in working conditions and expectations across these types of firms (LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020). [9] Similarly, former black state legislators are less likely to enter lobbying

[7]While there is some evidence that the number of contracts given to female lobbyists (but not the total number of registered female lobbyists) might change as legislative circumstances change (Strickland and Stauffer 2022), it is not clear whether on average organizations have a preference for minority or female lobbyists relative to their white and male counterparts.

[8]Some work suggests that minorities have similar levels of political ambition but are less likely to realize that ambition (Shah 2015).

[9]However, the use of in-house or contract lobbyists by an organization is likely also correlated with a number of other factors that might also contribute to the propensity of an organization to hire women and minorities as lobbyists. For example, some research suggests anecdotally that women are more likely to be found working as lobbyists on gender related issues (LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990). And there is older research on black lobbying efforts that suggests that groups likely to employ minority lobbyists were more focused on minority issues (Wolman and Thomas 1970).

than other former state legislators (Strickland and Tarr 2023).

The Demand for Minorities and Women

While there is extensive work on the supply of female and minority lobbyists, we do not know, however, whether interest group demand for female and minority lobbyists might contribute to (or mitigate) the lack of diversity among certain lobbying groups. But previous work does not provide a clear indicator of whether we should expect demand for women and minorities as lobbyists to be higher or lower relative to men and whites.

On the one hand, there is some evidence that women and minorities are discriminated against in their efforts to advance careers in politics (Butler and Preece 2016; Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2019; Ritchie and You 2021; Lajevardi 2020). There is significant evidence from other fields that people tend to hire and promote others like themselves which may slow gender and racial equality in traditionally male and white dominated fields (Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman 1998; Reskin 2000). Similarly, there is other work that has shown some evidence that political elites discriminate against minorities (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2019). More broadly, meta-analyses of work on gender discrimination in employment shows women are less likely to receive job interviews in male-dominated professions, of which lobbying is undoubtedly one (Galos and Coppock 2023; Koch, D'Mello, and Sackett 2015).

The focus on political ideology and partisanship among existing work suggests a preference among political elites for greater representation of women and minorities, and particularly among the ranks of liberal policymakers (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Fraga and Hassell 2021; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Kitchens and Swers 2016; Thomsen 2015; Thomsen and Swers 2017).[10] In addition, both parties have indicated a desire to incorporate minority voices into the policy process (Republican National Committee 2013; Crowder-Meyer and

[10]Doherty, Dowling, and Miller (2019) are slightly less positive in their evaluations of Democratic party chairs, finding consistent discrimination against minority candidates but also that those effects are attenuated among Democratic chairs depending on the demographic context of the district in which the candidate might be running.

Cooperman 2018), and other work indicates there may be a demand among some for minorities and women in politics among political elites (Fraga and Hassell 2021; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Kitchens and Swers 2016; Thomsen 2015; Thomsen and Swers 2017).

Moreover, we might expect greater demand for women and minorities to be strategic and thus greater among liberal aligned interest groups. Specifically, previous work suggests that the number of female lobbyists increases as the number of female legislators increases (Strickland and Stauffer 2022). Thus, the increase of women and minorities in elected office (many of whom are Democrats and more liberal) may drive lobbying firms' preference to hire more women and minorities in efforts to be more effective at influencing elected officials who share their identity. Alternatively, interest groups are interested in hiring lobbyists who have expertise in the policy area of interest (Miller et al. 2024). We might expect liberal groups to be more likely to be interested in hiring minorities and women because they might have more experience and knowledge about issues that are a priority for liberal organizations and thus better advocates. Previous work has indicated that women and minorities are more likely to act as lobbyists in single-issue areas aligned with their identity (Schlozman 1990; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020). Thus, research suggests heightened demand for women and minorities among left-leaning groups, but does not tell a similar story for a lack of preference (or bias) among conservative groups.

Lobbyist Diversity or the Lack Thereof

Before answering the question of whether there is greater or lesser demand for women and minorities as lobbyists, we begin by examining the racial and gender diversity of lobbyists. In order to examine the representation of women and minorities among the ranks of federal lobbyists, we rely on quarterly reports filed in compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act and administered by the US House and Senate. We use a version of this data acquired from private data provider Legistorm, who performs a variety of cleaning processes to the

raw data. Most importantly for our purposes, they create unique identifiers per lobbyist through rectifying name discrepancies from report to report. The full sample, from 2001-2020, includes 70,000 unique lobbyists from 11,765 lobbying organizations.

For a subset of the data, Legistorm collects race (30% of lobbyists) and gender (73% of lobbyists) information on the lobbyists. To fill in the race and gender for the remainder of the sample, we rely on the `wru` package in R to identify lobbyist race (Khanna, Imai, and Khanna 2019) and the `gender` package in R to identify lobbyist gender (Mullen, Blevins, and Schmidt 2018).[11] Some recent work has questioned the effectiveness of imputing race using name (Argyle and Barber 2023).[12] However, since we are only using these estimates for top-line descriptive trends (and not, say, individual level models) we report the `wru` predicted race. However, to provide some confidence in these top-line estimates, we also estimate the trends using just the individuals for whom race was specifically identified by Legistorm coders. Using only the hand-coded data from Legistorm, we find both extremely similar rates of minorities and women and in the trends over time (see Figure A1 and Figure A2 in the online appendix). Furthermore, these estimates are not drastically different from other estimates of the representation of women and minorities in lobbying taken at various times within our time frame (see LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas (2020), who find that roughly 37% of lobbyists are women, and LaPira and Thomas (2017) and Horsley (2021), who find that 10% of lobbyists have minority surnames and 17% of public affairs professionals (which includes many individuals who are not registered as lobbyists) are minorities, respectively).

Figure 1 shows the proportion of female lobbyists and the proportion of lobbyists who are non-minority over time. We note two things from this information. First, minorities and women are significantly underrepresented among lobbyists. Women make up between 37 and

[11]These tools, widely in the social sciences for this purpose (e.g. Barber and Holbein 2022), use a combination of first name and last name (for gender) combined with location of residence (for race) to estimate posterior probabilities of a given race and/or gender.

[12]To assess accuracy, we compare the estimates of race to the Legistorm-coded sample. While we achieve 91.4% accuracy using the `wru` package, the accuracy is primarily driven through correctly determining white names. We determine the estimated race by choosing the race with the highest probability per name.

42 percent of lobbyists and minorities make up between four and eight percent of lobbyists in the time period. Second, and more importantly, these numbers are increasing over time. While still drastically underrepresented, both underrepresented groups have increased their representation among the ranks of lobbyists over the last twenty years.

Figure 1: Diversity Trends Over Time



(a) Proportion of Female Lobbyists

(b) Proportion of Non-White Lobbyists

Note: This figure plots yearly average proportions of female and white lobbyists within lobbying organizations. *Data Source:* Legistorm **Takeaway:** Women and Minorities are underrepresented as federal lobbyists, but the percentage of female and minority lobbyists is trending upward.

Just looking at overall diversity, however, may mask important differences across the political spectrum in the representation of minorities and women among the ranks of federal lobbyists. To estimate group ideology, we use scores relying on survey responses by 1,210 federal lobbyists that are asked to place interest groups on a liberal-conservative ideological scale. Each lobbyist rates five groups, drawn at random among the 1,000 that spend the most on federal lobbying. Additionally, they are asked to rate the ideology of their current client. The groups' latent ideologies are then estimated from these ratings using Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey scaling. This provides expert perceptions of the ideology of approximately 1,400 interest groups, where 800 are among the top 1,000 lobbying spenders. While we test the sensitivity of our results to using CFScores (Bonica 2013, 2014) and IGScores (Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz 2020) as alternative measures of interest group ideology, there are a few benefits to using our perception scales. First, when investigating diversity among lobbyists, it

is important to know which groups make it into the sample and why. Since there are strategic reasons why organizations donate or choose to take a public stance on a topic, there might be selection issues complicating the inferences we can make from the sample where CFScores and IGScores are available. On the other hand, the survey-based scores target the 1,000 groups that spend the most, implying that the sampling frame is well-understood. Second, since organizations that spend more on lobbying tend to be active across a wider range of issues and have more influence on the policymaking process (Baumgartner et al. 2009), diversity among this subset is particularly crucial to understand. Whereas the alternative scales only have approximately 35% coverage among the 1,000 interest groups that spend the most on lobbying, the survey-based ratings cover approximately 80% of these groups. In Appendix E we show that among the 35% that have non-missing values on all three scales, there is a strong correlation between the three different measurement strategies.

Figure 2 displays the breakdown of lobbyists by gender and lobbying organization ideology separating out groups to the left and to the right of the mean.[13] The proportions are calculated as average proportion within lobbying organization of women lobbyists. In both right- and left-leaning organizations, the average proportion of women lobbyists is trending up since the beginning of sample. However, left-leaning organizations have consistently employed more women lobbyists and by 2020 there is nearly a 50/50 gender split in these organizations.[14]

Figure 3 similarly displays trends in lobbying diversity by race over time. Two things are evident from this figure: first, lobbying is a profession consisting of mostly white individuals, with less than 10% of lobbyists as non-white. Second, the there are on average decreases

[13]In addition, in the online appendix, we also breakdown the diversity of lobbying groups by the industry they support in their advocacy (see Figures A5 – A8). Consistent with previous work, we find that women and minorities are also much more likely to be represented in fields more likely to be focused on minority and women's issues (Wolman and Thomas 1970). Specifically, female lobbyists make up a greater percentage of lobbyists in the health sector (and specifically those lobbying for interests related to nursing and pyschiatric health) and single-issue groups focused on abortion, women's issues and children's rights. Similarly, non-white lobbyists are most likely to be found lobbying on behalf of labor and single-issue ideological groups.

[14]The presence of female lobbyists among conservative groups remains relatively consistent until about 2014 when it rises sharply. In contrast, there appears to be a relatively consistent growth in the proportion of lobbyists who are female in left-leaning organizations over the time period.

Figure 2: Lobbyist Diversity by Gender



Note: This figure plots yearly average proportions of women lobbyists within lobbying organizations split by ideology. *Data Source:* Legistorm. **Takeaway:** There is greater representation of female lobbyists among liberal groups, but the percentage of lobbyists who are women is trending upward among both conservative and liberal groups.

(increases) in the proportion of white (non-white) lobbyists over time, with a relatively consistent divide between left- and right-leaning organizations.[15]

A Demand for Women and Minorities in Lobbying?

Although women and minorities are underrepresented in lobbying, there are trends towards better representation. Might demand for women and minorities among those involved in hiring lobbyists help advance that trend, or is this trend occurring despite discriminatory

[15]We might be concerned that this is entirely driven by a preponderance of groups who are focused on minority or gender issues who would want to hire lobbyists who look like their members and contributors. This, however, does not appear to be the case. In Appendix Figures A3 and A4 we display these same figures, but omit women's issues groups and civil rights issue groups, respectively. This demonstrates that is not just an ideological imbalance in the types of groups (i.e., more womens' groups are left leaning) that creates the demonstrated imbalance.

Figure 3: Lobbyist Diversity by Race



Note: This figure plots yearly average proportions of white lobbyists within lobbying organizations split by ideology. *Data Source:* Legistorm. **Takeaway:** There is slightly greater representation of minority lobbyists among liberal groups, but the percentage of lobbyists who are minorities is trending upward among both conservative and liberal groups.

hiring preferences?

To investigate the preferences for women and minority lobbyists in the hiring process, we use a conjoint experiment completed by political elites with intimate knowledge of the hiring process for lobbyists. By using a conjoint experiment, we avoid issues posed by data and measurement limitations, such as not being able to observe the race and gender characteristics of the population of people who endeavor to enter lobbying. In addition, the natural correlation of some lobbyist characteristics in the real world, such as their procedural and substantive expertise with other characteristics of interest (i.e.,gender or race) could make it difficult to determine the importance of those particular characteristics. As such, the conjoint design allows us to isolate the independent effects of our characteristics of interest. Additionally, our conjoint design minimizes social desirability bias by presenting respondents

with a multidimensional choice context in which they can rationalize social undesirable choices using the other characteristics' of applicants profiles (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022). This feature of the conjoint design is particularly important for our substantive interest in discrimination, as it allows respondents to conceal choices which discriminate on the basis of race or gender by ostensibly evaluating applicants on other aspects of their resumes.

To implement the conjoint experiment, we identified all individuals listed as points of contact or lobbyists on organized interests' Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) reports filed between the first quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of 2020.[16] Of the 11,341 individuals we identified, 888 participated in our experiment for an overall response rate of 7.8%, a rate similar to other survey experiments of American political elites (see Hassell, Holbein, and Miles 2020; Miller 2021). In the online appendix, we provide additional information about the characteristics of the sample (see Tables A3 and A4).

Lobbyists are an ideal sample for testing this question because they have a detailed knowledge of the job and are actively engaged in the hiring process for lobbyists (e.g., Drutman 2015; Kersh 2002). Indeed, a strong majority of our respondents reported that they actively participate in hiring decisions in situations where their employer seeks new lobbyists. In our sample, 508 respondents (57.2%) indicated that they are "always" involved in the process, while another 244 (27.5%) indicated that they are "sometimes" or "often" involved. In short, our respondents have the requisite knowledge and experience with the hiring process to shed light on interests' preferences over lobbyists' characteristics.

After answering pre-treatment questions, respondents were asked to complete two conjoint tasks sequentially. In brief explanatory prompts offered before each of these tasks, respondents were randomly assigned to imagine that they are completing the tasks during a period of unified Democratic or Republican control of Congress and the White House. In each task,

[16]Our research was approved by the IRB at [Redacted], and each respondent voluntarily provided informed consent at the beginning of the survey.

respondents were first asked to imagine working for an organization looking to hire a new lobbyist and that they have been asked to assist in the hiring process. These vignettes included three pieces of randomized information about the organization seeking to hire a lobbyist (its structure as a lobbying firm or a national association, the policy area on which it focuses, and its ideological inclination) and a summary of the resume of the applicants that included eight additional pieces of information.[17] While many of these items pertained to applicants' skills and experience in lobbying and policymaking, such as whether they had previous lobbying experience in the issue area for which the organization is hiring, two of the items explicitly stated the applicants' gender (male or female) and race (Asian, Black, Hispanic/Latino, or White).[18] Respondents evaluated three applicants and were asked to choose one for an interview.[19] A potential concern could be that some respondents want to give the impression that a given characteristic is more important for hiring decisions than it actually is. However, recent methodological research suggests that such demand effects generally do not plague survey experiments because it would require respondents to correctly infer the experimenter's intent (Mummolo and Peterson 2019). In that regard, it is important to note that the conjoint design helps us to mask the intent with our experiment by providing many attributes to justify hiring decisions (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). In Appendix F we examine whether respondents were able to infer the purpose of the study using an open-ended question, where we asked for additional insights on the hiring process. We

[17]One potential concern about this construction—asking respondents to imagine working for an organization with a specific ideological inclination—is that respondents' choices may reflect their expectation of what an organization with the assigned ideology would prefer rather than what they personally would select. To address this concern, we restrict the analysis to individuals evaluating hiring decisions for firms that align with their own ideology. The AMCEs from this alternative specification are slightly stronger than those obtained using the full sample, though they are no longer statistically distinguishable because this restricted sample is smaller than one-third the size of the full sample. The similarity of the AMCEs suggests that our findings are not an artifact of respondents making assumptions about what certain types of organizations might prefer (see Table A8).

[18]See Table A1 for a full description of the attribute-levels included in the resume summaries.

[19]While conjoint experiments often include only two profiles per task, we utilize three profiles per task to increase our number of observations. Jenke et al. (2021) show that unbiased average marginal component effects can be estimated when tasks include more than two profiles.

show that only 24 respondents remarked on gender and race, where as 64 and 220 remarked on aspects of connections to Members of Congress or the applicant's reputation, education, previous work experience and expertise. Thus, if some respondents were able to guess the purpose of the study, they were very few. Additionally, examining the text of the open-ended remarks, it seems that most discussed whether it was realistic that race and gender were on the resume.

While resumes typically do not explicitly state applicants' race or gender, extant work indicates that individuals often use names, which are provided in job applications, to make inferences about personal characteristics such as race and gender (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Broockman 2013; Einstein and Glick 2017). Additionally, individuals reviewing applications can acquire information about applicants' race or gender through other content in an application (e.g., contents of a cover letter) or other resources they may consult (e.g., social media profiles; see Acquisti and Fong 2020; Manant, Pajak, and Soulié 2019).[20]

Our potential limitation of our experimental design is that, while interest in interviewing candidates is regularly used as a measure of employment discrimination (e.g. Quillian et al. 2017), it captures potential hiring discrimination at the interview stage, but cannot observe potential discrimination that manifests independently at later stages of the hiring process, such as the job offer and negotiation stages (although we do note that in this exercise, respondents were also only allowed to select one candidate to interview rather than selecting a cohort of potential candidates to interview). Regardless, assessing discrimination at the interview stage is substantively important because it is the first step of the winnowing process by which hiring officials limit their choice set of potential employees and because discrimination at the interview stage is typically related to discrimination at later stages

[20]An alternative design would have provided applicant names meant to signal race and gender and used those names to code those characteristics in the analysis stage. However, recent work indicates that individuals often use names to infer other characteristics that can be correlated with gender and race, such as socioeconomic status, that would make it difficult for us to attribute treatment effects to gender or race in isolation (Crabtree et al. 2022; Landgrave and Weller 2022). Therefore, by providing applicant race and gender explicitly, we avoid the potential for names to constitute bundled treatments and can directly attribute effects to the levels of our race and gender attributes.

(Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort 1996; Neumark 2018; Quillian, Lee, and Oliver 2020; Riach and Rich 2002).[21] Thus, while our design cannot track potential discrimination through the entirety of the hiring process, we can observe the extent to which hiring officials in the lobbyist are open to consider hiring applicants with different racial and gender characteristics.

We use respondents' forced choices to estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which indicate "the marginal effect of [a given attribute] averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 10). Substantively, each of our AMCEs represent the effect a particular applicant attribute-level on the probability a respondent will choose to interview that applicant relative to a randomly selected profile with the baseline level of that attribute. We estimate AMCEs using linear regression as implemented by the `cregg` package in `R` (Leeper 2020), with our forced choice outcome regressed on a series of indicator variables representing each of our non-baseline attribute-levels and standard errors clustered at the respondent level.[22]

Overall Racial and Gender Preference in the Hiring Process

We begin by examining the effect of gender on the overall likelihood that one of our respondents would choose a particular applicant as the applicant they would most like to interview.[23] As shown in Figure 4, women were actually six percentage points more likely to be chosen to be interviewed than men. Rather than being discriminated against in the interview process, we

[21] The relative effect of discrimination at different stages of the hiring process can vary across contexts; for instance, while Neumark (2018) notes that some studies conducted by the International Labor Organization demonstrated that around 90% of the total effect of ethnic discrimination occurred at the interview stage as compared to the job offer stage, a meta-analysis by Quillian, Lee, and Oliver (2020) suggests that racial discrimination manifests more strongly at the job offer stage than at the interview stage. However, even Quillian, Lee, and Oliver note that "close to half of the total discrimination in hiring occurs from initial application to callback" and that discrimination at each stage tends to move together (2020, 753).

[22] In our pre-analysis plan we pre-registered hypotheses that include 27 comparisons between specific attribute-levels and their baselines as well as between specific pairs of attribute-levels. As a result, in this analysis, we correct the α level used to evaluate our hypothesis tests and construct our confidence intervals to $\frac{0.05}{27} \approx 0.002$ even though we do not analyze all 27 comparisons in this work.

[23] An alternative analysis would be to look at the effect that race and gender attributes have on the ordinal ratings that respondents gave to each applicant. In the Online Appendix in Table A6 we run those alternative analyses, however, the results we present here are similar to those produced by the ordinal rating outcomes.

find that female applicants are viewed more positively by individuals who would be involved in the hiring process for new lobbyists. Changing the gender of the applicant from male to female increases the likelihood of being selected for an interview by six percentage points.

Figure 4: Interest in Potential Lobbyist Candidates by Race and Gender



Note: Effects of race and gender characteristics on the likelihood of being chosen to interview for lobbyist position **Takeaway:** Women and minorities are slightly more likely to be identified as a candidate to be interviewed for a position in lobbying.

We also find similar effects for minority applicants. As shown in Figure 4, Hispanic/Latino candidates were seven percentage points more likely to be chosen to be interviewed than white candidates. Likewise, respondents were eight percentage points more likely to to choose

to interview a Black applicant for the lobbying position compared to a white applicant. We do not, however, find any positive effect for Asian applicants.

Before discussing the size of the effect, we pause to note that while organized groups involve individuals with different ideological preferences in the hiring process (Miller et al. 2024), there might be a concern that these effects are driven by individuals making poor assumptions about their colleagues on the opposite side of the spectrum (e.g., when conservatives are asked to evaluate the hiring preferences of a liberal organization, they assume they have a greater preference to hire women and minorities). As such, in the online appendix, we re-run the analysis excluding what might be seen as unreasonable hiring situations (i.e., conservative (liberal) lobbyists making hiring decisions for liberal (conservative) firms). These results, found in Table A11 are also statistically significant and provide similar effect estimates.

Moving to the size of the effects, we find these effects are not large. In addition to applicants' gender and race, we also include in Figure 4 one of the other attributes included in our experiment that described applicants' skills and expertise—applicants' Policy Experience, which specifies whether the applicant has experience lobbying in the substantive policy area for which the respondent's organization is hiring. The AMCE for Policy Match indicates that respondents were 32 percentage points more likely to choose to interview an applicant whose substantive expertise matches the policy area the organization is hiring for relative to another randomly generated applicant whose substantive expertise is not in that area of interest. That this AMCE is five to six times larger than those for female, Black, and Hispanic/Latino helps contextualize that while respondents were more likely to select applicants from underrepresented gender and racial backgrounds, the positive effects of race and gender are vastly overshadowed by other characteristics related to the applicants' skills-based qualifications.

However, at the same time, while other employment decisions are often plagued by discrimination against minorities and women, our results suggest this is not the case in the lobbying world. In contrast, our results indicate minorities and women are favored in the

hiring process. In our conjoint experiment, female and minority applicants are significantly more likely to be chosen to interview for a lobbying position than are their white and male counterparts, though these positive effects are small relative to the effects associated with the skills and expertise valued among lobbyists, such as experience lobbying in the substantive policy area of interest. These results may help explain why the percentage of minorities and women in lobbyist positions have increased in recent decades despite continuing to be a smaller percentage of potential applicants.

Heterogeneity in the Hiring Process

Overall results, however, may mask important differences across ideologies and parties. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that liberals and conservatives differ in how much they value descriptive representation (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019). As such, we specifically separate out liberal and conservative respondents to identify how preferences for minority and female candidates varies by ideology.

Similarly, we find a 10 (7) percentage point increase in the likelihood of selecting an applicant for an interview if that applicant is Black (Hispanic) relative to white applicants among liberals, differences that are all statistically significant. In contrast, we find smaller (and insignificant) effects for applicant race among conservative respondents. Similarly, in analyzing gender, we find that while conservative respondents were four percentage points more likely to select a female applicant for an interview, that effect is not statistically significant. However, liberal respondents are six percentage points more likely to select the female applicant, a difference that is statistically significant. In short, the inclination to hire minority and female candidates to lobbying positions appears to be driven by the preferences of liberal respondents. While conservative respondents do not express preferences against hiring women and minorities, they do not express significantly more interest in interviewing

Figure 5: Interest in Potential Lobbyist Candidates by Race and Gender Conditional on Respondent Ideology



Note: Effects of race and gender characteristics on the likelihood of being chosen to interview for lobbyist position by the ideology of the respondent **Takeaway:** Women and minorities are slightly more likely to be interviewed for a position in lobbying, and these effects are stronger among liberal than among conservative respondents.

them relative to White and male applicants.[24,25]

[24]While the treatment effects are statistically distinguishable from zero among liberals but not conservatives, we note that the differences in the treatment effects between liberals and conservatives are not themselves distinguishable. Thus, we find that liberals prefer to interview women and minorities and no evidence that conservatives express similar preferences, but we do not find evidence that the preferences of liberals are different from those of conservatives.

[25]As before, we might be concerned that these effects are driven by individuals making poor assumptions

Conclusion

As we noted at the beginning of this work, racial and gender diversity have a significant and substantive effect on the policy making process. The inclusion of women and minorities in that process fundamentally changes the issues and approaches to policy and improves the representation of individuals from those groups (Grose 2011; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014; Swers 2002). In this paper, we have examined one previously under scrutinized component of that policy making process, namely, the gender and racial diversity of lobbyists working on Capitol Hill.

We find that while the representation of women and minorities among those involved in lobbyist activity has substantially increased over time, these individuals are still underrepresented in the lobbying community. While female lobbyists made up 37 percent of individuals working in lobbying in 2001, that number had increased to 42 percent by 2020. Similarly, while whites made up almost 96 percent of all lobbyists in 2004, that number had declined slightly to 92 percent by 2020.

The underrepresentation of minorities and women, however, is greater among groups from the conservative side of the ideological spectrum than it is among those that are more liberal in their ideological leanings. On the whole, women and minorities made up a greater proportion of lobbyists among groups that were more left leaning.

In addition, the results from our conjoint experiment provide some evidence that a portion

of the desires of groups from the opposite side of the political spectrum. As such, we re-run these analysis we repeat this analysis among only those respondents assigned to imagine working for hypothetical organization whose ideology matches their own (see Table A8). In this case, because we are splitting the sample (and eliminating all 'moderate' lobbyists from our analysis given our focus on liberals and conservatives) and eliminating all evaluations of hiring for ideologically opposite groups, our sample is smaller than one-third the size of the full sample, which, when combined with the multiple hypothesis penalty, drastically reduces our power. The AMCEs in this alternative model are actually slightly stronger than those depicted in Figure 5, especially among liberal respondents, however, they are not longer statistically distinguishable because of the drastically reduced power (they are still statistically significant at standard levels without the severe multiple hypothesis penalty). These results make us cautiously optimistic that our results are not driven by respondents assigned to organizations whose ideology differ from their own and project what they assume are the preferences of ideologically dissonant groups on applicants' gender and racial characteristics when making their choices.

of these declines could be attributed to affirmative decisions among those in positions to hire lobbyists to prioritize the hiring of minorities and women to those positions. In our experiment, we find that minority and female applicants are more likely to be selected for an interview relative to their white and male counterparts. On the whole, individuals in positions to hire lobbyists appear to be more inclined to hire those from underrepresented groups.

These effects, however, appear to be concentrated among liberals relative to conservatives in ways that appear to align with patterns in actual staffing behaviors. We find that while the preference for minorities and women is significant among liberal respondents, it smaller and insignificant among conservatives.

While our findings shed some light into the demand that interest groups have for hiring women and minorities as lobbyists, there is still more work to be done to understand the reasons why there is a greater demand to interview minorities and women for lobbying positions. On the one hand, greater demand for women and minorities could be because of a recognition of the need for such individuals. Alternatively, greater demand for women and minorities could also be the result of perceptions among respondents that women who are similarly qualified as men are higher quality candidates given the more difficult pathway they face to gain those qualifications (see for example, Fulton 2010). Although our work shows slightly higher demand for women and minorities as lobbyists, future work would be well to identify the motivations for those demands.

Overall, however, our evidence suggests that women and minorities are favored in the lobbyist hiring process and indicate that while there has been progress made through increasing the representation of diverse voices in lobbying in recent years, there are still significant steps to be made.

References

Acquisti, Alessandro, and Christina Fong. 2020. "An experiment in hiring discrimination via online social networks." *Management Science* 66(3): 1005–1024.

American Bar Association. 2020. "ABA Profile of the Legal Profession." **URL:** `https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/potlp2020.pdf`.

Argyle, Lisa P, and Michael Barber. 2023. "Letter Misclassification and Bias in Predictions of Individual Ethnicity from Administrative Records." *American Political Science Review* .

Banducci, Susan A, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A Karp. 2004. "Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation." *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 534–556.

Barber, Michael, and John B Holbein. 2022. "400 Million Voting Records Show Profound Racial and Geographic Disparities in Voter Turnout in the United States." *PloS One* 17(6): e0268134.

Bath, Michael G., Jennifer Gayvert-Owen, and Anthony J. Nownes. 2005. "Women Lobbyists: The Gender Gap and Interest Representation." *Politics and Policy* 33(1): 136–152.

Baumgartner, Frank R, Jeffrey M Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth L Leech, and David C Kimball. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination." *American Economic Review* 94(4): 991–1013.

Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. 2006. "Number of Black Lobbyists Remains Shockingly Low." *Washington Post* **URL:** `https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2006/08/07/number-of-black-lobbyists-remains-shockingly-low`.(August 7).

Bishu, Sebawit G., and Andrea M. Headley. 2020. "Equal Employment Opportunity: Women Bureaucrats in Male-Dominated Professions." *Public Administration Review* 80(6): 1063–1074.

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *The American Economic Review* 102(7): 3731.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Franklin D. Jr. Gilliam. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review* 84(2): 377–393.

Bonica, Adam. 2013. "Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2): 294–311.

Bonica, Adam. 2014. "Mapping the Ideological Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 367–386.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 658–679.

Brenson, Lashonda. 2020. "Racial Diversity Among Top Staff in Senate Personal Offices." *Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies* **URL:** `https://jointcenter.org/racial-diversity-among-top-staff-in-senate-personal-offices`.

Broockman, David E. 2013. "Black Politicians are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 521–536.

Burgat, Casey. 2017. "Among House Staff, Women are Well Represented. Just not in the Senior Positions." *Washington Post* **URL:** `https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/20/among-house-staff-women-are-well-represented-just-not-in-the-senior-positions/`(June 20).

Butler, Daniel M., and Jessica Robinson Preece. 2016. "Recruitment and Perceptions of Gender Bias in Party Leader Support." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(4): 842–851.

Center for American Women and Politics. 2022. "Women in Elected Office 2022." **URL:** `https://cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/current-numbers/women-elective-office-2022`.

Chewning, Taylor K., Jon Green, Hans J.G. Hassell, and Matthew R. Miles. 2022. "Campaign Principal-Agent Problems: Volunteers as Faithful and Representative Agents." *Political Behavior* .

Cohen, Lisa E., Joseph P. Broschak, and Heather Haveman. 1998. "And Then There were More? The Effects of Organizational Sex Composition on the Hiring and Promotion of Managers." *American Sociological Review* 63(5): 711–727.

Cornwell, Christopher, and J Edward Kellough. 1994. "Women and Minorities in Federal Government agencies: Examining New Evidence from Panel Data." *Public Administration Review* 54(3): 265–270.

Crabtree, Charles, S Michael Gaddis, John B Holbein, and Edvard Nergård Larsen. 2022. "Racially Distinctive Names Signal Both Race/Ethnicity and Social Class." *Sociological Science* 9: 454–472.

Crosson, Jesse M, Alexander C Furnas, and Geoffrey M Lorenz. 2020. "Polarized Pluralism: Organizational Preferences and Biases in the American Pressure System." *American Political Science Review* 114(4): 1117–1137.

Crowder-Meyer, Melody, and Rosalyn Cooperman. 2018. "Can't Buy Them Love: How Party Culture among Donors Contributes to the Party Gap in Women's Representation." *Journal of Politics* 80(4): 1211–1224.

Dodson, Debra L. 2006. *The Impact of Women in Congress*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Doherty, David, Conor M. Dowling, and Michael G. Miller. 2019. "Do Local Party Chairs Think Women and Minority Candidates Can Win? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment." *Journal of Politics* 81(4): 1282–1297.

Drutman, Lee. 2015. *The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dynes, Adam M., Hans J.G. Hassell, Jessica R. Preece, and Matthew R. Miles. 2021. "Personality and Gendered Selection Processes in the Political Pipeline." *Politics & Gender* 17(1): 53–73.

Einstein, Katherine Levine, and David M Glick. 2017. "Does Race Affect Access to Government Services? An Experiment Exploring Street-Level Bureaucrats and Access to Public Housing." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1): 100–116.

Enos, Ryan D., and Eitan D. Hersh. 2015. "Party Activists as Campaign Advertisers: The Ground Campaign as a Principal-Agent Problem." *American Political Science Review* 109(2): 252–278.

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2005. "To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 642–659.

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2014. "Uncovering the Origins of the Gender Gap in Political Ambition." *American Political Science Review* 108(August): 1–21.

Fraga, Bernard L, and Hans J.G. Hassell. 2021. "Are Minority and Women Candidates Penalized by Party Politics? Race, Gender, and Access to Party Support." *Political Research Quarterly* 74(3): 540–555.

Fulton, Sarah A. 2010. "Running Backwards and in High Heels: The Gendered Quality Gap and Incumbent Electoral Success." *Political Research Quarterly* 65(2): 303–314.

Furnas, Alexander C, Michael T Heaney, and Timothy M LaPira. 2019. "The Partisan Ties of Lobbying Firms." *Research & Politics* 6(3).

Galos, Diana Roxana, and Alexander Coppock. 2023. "Gender Composition Predicts Gender Bias: A Meta-Reanalysis of Hiring Discrimination Audit Experiments." *Science Advances* 9(eade7979).

Gangitano, Alex. 2020. "Women Rise on K Street–Slowly." *The Hill* **URL:** `https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/518305-women-rise-on-k-street-slowly/`(September 28).

Gerrity, Jessica C., Tracy Osborn, and Jeanette Morehouse Mendez. 2007. "Women and Representation: A Different View of the District?" *Politics and Gender* 3(2): 179–200.

Grose, Christian R. 2011. *Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Grossmann, Matt, and David A. Hopkins. 2016. *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices Via Stated Preference Experiments." *Political Analysis* 22(1): 1–30.

Hall, Richard L, and Alan V Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 69–84.

Hassell, Hans J.G., and Neil Visalvanich. 2019. "The Party's Primary Preferences: Race, Gender, and Party Support of Congressional Primary Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 63(4): 905–919.

Hassell, Hans J.G., John B. Holbein, and Matthew R. Miles. 2020. "There is No Liberal

Media Bias in the News Political Journalists Choose to Cover." *Science Advances* 6(14): eaay9344.

Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. *African American Legislators in the American States*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Holyoke, Thomas T. 2021. "Strategic Lobbying and the Pressure to Compromise Member Interests." *Political Research Quarterly* 75(4): 1255–1270.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, Zachary Markovich, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2022. "Does Conjoint Analysis Mitigate Social Desirability Bias?" *Political Analysis* 30(4): 535–549.

Horsley, Laura. 2021. DEI Survey: Public Affairs Profession Recognizes the Challenge Before It. Technical report Public Affairs Council Washington, D.C.: .

Jenke, Libby, Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner. 2021. "Using Eye-Tracking to Understand Decision-Making in Conjoint Experiments." *Political Analysis* 21(1): 75–101.

Karpowitz, Christopher F., and Tali Mendelberg. 2014. *The Silent Sex: Gender, Deliberations, and Institutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keiser, Lael R., Vicky M. Wilkins, Kenneth J. Meier, and Catherine A. Holland. 2002. "Lipstick and Logarithms: Gender, Institutional Context, and Representative Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 553–564.

Kersh, Rogan. 2002. "Corporate Lobbyists as Political Actors: A View from the Field." In *Interest Group Politics*, ed. Allan J Cigler, and Burdett A Loomis. 6th ed. Washington, D.C: CQ Press pp. 225–248.

Khanna, Kabir, Kosuke Imai, and Maintainer Kabir Khanna. 2019. "Package 'wru'.".

Kitchens, Karin E., and Michele L. Swers. 2016. "Why Aren't There More Republican Women in Congress? Gender, Partisanship, and Fundraising Support in the 2010 and 2012 Elections." *Politics & Gender* 12(4): 648–676.

Koch, Amanda J., Susan D. D'Mello, and Paul R. Sackett. 2015. "A Meta-Analysis of Gender Stereotypes and Bias in Experimental Simulations of Employment Decision Making." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 100(1): 128–161.

Lajevardi, Nazita. 2020. "Access Denied: Exploring Muslim American Representation and Exclusion by State Legislators." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 8(5): 957–985.

Landgrave, Michelangelo, and Nicholas Weller. 2022. "Do Name-Based Treatments Violate Information Equivalence? Evidence from a Correspondence Audit Experiment." *Political Analysis* 30(1): 142–148.

LaPira, Timothy, and Herschel F. Thomas. 2017. *Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation of Interests*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

LaPira, Timothy M, and Herschel F. Thomas. 2014. "Revolving Door Lobbyists and Interest Representation." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 3(1): 4–29.

LaPira, Timothy M., Kathleen Marchetti, and Herschel F. Thomas. 2020. "Gender Politics in the Lobbying Profession." *Politics & Gender* 16(3): 816–844.

Lawless, Jennifer L., and Richard L. Fox. 2004. "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 264–280.

Lawless, Jennifer L., and Richard L. Fox. 2010. *It Still Takes A Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Leech, Beth L. 2014. *Lobbyists at Work*. New York: Apress.

Leeper, Thomas J. 2020. "cregg: Simple Conjoint Tidying, Analysis, and Visualization." *R package version 0.4.0* .

Levine, Bertram J. 2009. *The Art of Lobbying: Building Trust and Selling Policy*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Lowande, Kenneth, Melinda Ritchie, and Erinn Lauterbach. 2019. "Descriptive and Substantive Representation in Congress: Evidence from 80,000 Congressional Inquiries." *American Journal of Political Science* 63(3): 644–659.

Lucas, Jennifer C., and Mark S. Hyde. 2012. "Men and Women Lobbyists in the American States." *Social Science Quarterly* 93(2): 394–414.

Manant, Matthieu, Serge Pajak, and Nicolas Soulié. 2019. "Can social media lead to labor market discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment." *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* 28(2): 225–246.

McCrain, Joshua. 2018. "Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections." *Journal of Politics* 80(4): 1369–1383.

Miller, David R., Josh McCrain, Hans J.G. Hassell, and Benjamin C.K. Egerod. 2024. "Partisanship, Expertise, or Connections? A Conjoint Survey Experiment on Lobbyist Hiring Decisions." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* .

Miller, David Ryan. 2021. "On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests' Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* .

Mullen, Lincoln, C Blevins, and B Schmidt. 2018. "Gender: Predict Gender from Names Using Historical Data. R Package Version 0.5.2.".

Mummolo, Jonathan, and Erik Peterson. 2019. "Demand Effects in Survey Experiments: An Empirical Assessment." *American Political Science Review* 113(2): 517–529.

Naff, Katherine C. 1998. "Progress toward Achieving a Representative Federal Bureaucracy: The Impact of Supervisors and Their Beliefs." *Public Personnel Management* 27(2): 135–150.

Neumark, David. 2018. "Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination." *Journal of Economic Literature* 56(3): 799–866.

Neumark, David, Roy J Bank, and Kyle D Van Nort. 1996. "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111(3): 915–941.

Nownes, Anthony J., and Patricia K. Freeman. 1998. "Female Lobbyists: Women in the World of 'Good Ol ' Boys'." *Journal of Politics* 60(4): 1181–1201.

Potter, Rachel Augustine, and Craig Volden. 2018. "Women's Leadership and Policymaking in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy." *Princeton University Working Paper* **URL:** `https://csdp.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf2376/files/media/potter_volden_112018.pdf`.

Preece, Jessica, and Olga Stoddard. 2015. "Why Women don't Run: Experimental Evidence on Gender Differences in Political Competition Aversion." *Journal of Economic Behavior Organization* 117(sep): 296–308.

Quillian, Lincoln, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, and Arnfinn H. Midtbøen. 2017. "Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring Over Time." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114(41): 10870–10875.

Quillian, Lincoln, John J Lee, and Mariana Oliver. 2020. "Evidence from Field Experiments in Hiring Shows Substantial Additional Racial Discrimination After the Callback." *Social Forces* 99(2): 732–759.

Republican National Committee. 2013. *Growth & Opportunity Project*. Technical report produced by the Republican National Committee, Washington, DC: .

Reskin, Barbara F. 2000. "Getting It Right: Sex and Race Inequality in Work Organizations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 707–709.

Riach, Peter A, and Judith Rich. 2002. "Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place." *Economic Journal* 112(483): F480–F518.

Ritchie, Melinda N., and Hye Young You. 2021. "Women's Advancement in Politics: Evidence from Congressional Staff." *Journal of Politics* 83(2): 421–438.

Schaeffer, Katherine. 2021. "Racial, Ethnic Diversity Increases Yet Again with the 117th Congress." *Pew Research Center* **URL:** `https://cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/current-numbers/women-elective-office-2022`.

Schiff, Eleanor L, Kim Seufer, Anne Whitesell, and David Lowery. 2015. "Agency Problems and Interest Representation: An Empirical Analysis of the Costs of Lobbying." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 4(3): 225–248.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman. 1990. "Representing Women in Washington: Sisterhood and Pressure Politics." In *Women, Politics, and Change*, ed. Louise A. Tilly, and Patricia Gurin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Shah, Paru. 2015. "Stepping Up: Black Political Ambition and Success." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3(apr): 278–294.

Stephenson, Matthew C., and Howell E. Jackson. 2010. "Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System." *Harvard Journal on Legislation* 47(1): 1–20.

Strickland, James M. 2020. "The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(1): 67–81.

Strickland, James M., and Katelyn E. Stauffer. 2022. "Legislative Diversity and the Rise of Women Lobbyists." *Political Research Quarterly* 75(3): 531–546.

Strickland, James M, and Nathan Tarr. 2023. "Diversity for Access? Legislative Diversity, Identity Group Mobilization, and Lobbying." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* pp. 1–22.

Swers, Michele L. 2002. *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thomsen, Danielle M. 2015. "Why So Few (Republican) Women? Explaining the Partisan Imbalance of Women in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40(may): 295–323.

Thomsen, Danielle M., and Michele L. Swers. 2017. "Which Women Can Run? Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate Donor Networks." *Political Research Quarterly* 70(2): 449–463.

Wolbrecht, Christina. 2000. *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wolman, Harold L., and Norman C. Thomas. 1970. "Black Interests, Black Groups, and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process: The Cases of Housing and Education." *Journal of Politics* 32(4): 875–897.

Women Donors Network. 2014. "Who Leads Us? A Project of The Reflective Democracy Campaign." **URL:** `http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/blogs/WDN-Reflective-Democracy-Campaign-Information-Kit.pdf`.

Yackee, Susan Webb. 2006. "Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16(1): 103–124.

Ziniel, Curtis E. 2021. "Colouring Representation: Staff Racial Employment Patterns in US Congressional Offices." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 44(15): 2836–2856.

Online Appendix for "Lobbying Against Discrimination: Evidence of Racial and Gender Discrimination in Lobbyist Hiring Decisions"

(Not intended for print publication)

Contents

A Conjoint Experiment Additional Information **1**

B Sampling Procedure and Descriptive Statistics **6**

C Empirical Results **13**

D Race and Gender Estimation **23**

E Correlations between Group Ideology Scales **30**

F Did Respondents Guess the Study's Purpose? **32**

A Conjoint Experiment Additional Information

Protocol

After providing consent and completing pre-treatment questions, respondents were provided with the following preface to the two conjoint tasks:

> The following two hypothetical scenarios will ask you to assume the role of a lobbyist working for a client or firm and to help organization hire a new lobbyist to join your team.
>
> For the purposes of these scenarios, assume that you are working in a context of unified government where [Democrats/Republicans] control the House, Senate, and the White House.

Note that in this preface, respondents were randomly assigned to imagine that either Democrats or Republicans had unified control of the federal government and that this randomization was fixed across both of respondents' tasks. We included this randomization to encourage respondents to abstract away from the real-world political context that existed at the time and idiosyncratic features that might inform their decisionmaking in an actual hiring process, and instead to draw on their general evaluations of the job candidates we presented to them.[26]

Conjoint Vignette and Randomization Details

Each conjoint task presented respondents with the following text, followed by three applicant profiles with randomly assigned levels for each attribute:

[26]Our survey was fielded between December 1, 2020 and January 3, 2021. During this period lame duck period of the 116th Congress, Democrats held the House of Representatives while Republicans held the White House and the Senate. Prior to the outcome of the Senate elections in Georgia held on January 3, 2021 and not called until after response collection ceased, it was unknown whether the 117th Congress would see a unified Democratic government or a divided government where Democrats controlled the House and the White House but Republicans controlled the Senate. Our abstraction was intended to draw respondents away from thinking about this particular moment in American politics and how it might influence their hiring decisions and instead consider how they utilize information about job candidates to make hiring decisions in a general sense. For instance, our abstraction precludes the possibility that a respondent might have an expectation about which member of Congress was likely to hold a committee chair relevant for the issues area we identified in our experiments in the upcoming 117th Congress and thus chose a specific job candidate profile because they thought that type of candidate would be best able to lobby that member of Congress.

> Imagine that you work as a lobbyist for a [**lobbying firm/national association**] that focuses on [**real estate/tax**] policy. Your organization is generally considered to be [**liberal/conservative/bipartisan**].
>
> Your organization is hiring a new lobbyist to join your team, and you have been asked to participate in the hiring process. Your organization wants the new hire to help analyze new legislation and regulations affecting [**real estate/tax**] policy and lobby members of Congress on its behalf.
>
> You are currently screening applicant resumes to decide which applicants you would like to personally interview for the position. Below are the summaries of 3 resumes you are considering.

Note that in addition to the profile attribute-levels, this text randomizes three other facets.

- First, the substantive policy focus of the organization featured in each task was randomly assigned to be either real estate or tax policy. In order to encourage respondents to consider each task independently and to account for potential task-ordering effects, each respondent completed one task with each substantive policy focus and the order in which policy focuses were presented was randomized for each respondent.
- Second, the structure of organization featured in each task was randomly assigned to be either a national association or a lobbying firm. This randomization occurred at the task-level, such that respondents could have completed two tasks in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by a national association or by a lobbying firm, or one task in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by an association and another in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by a firm.
- Third, the organization's ideological leanings expressed in each task was randomly assigned to be liberal, conservative or bipartisan. Like the structure of the organization, this randomization occurred at the task-level.

Each applicant profile was populated with the attribute-levels provided in Table A1. To mitigate potential attribute-ordering effects, we randomized the order in which attributes appeared for each task (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). For analysis, we recoded the attribute-levels as shown in Table A2. In order for the non-restricted attribute-levels in Table A2 to appear with equal probability and for the restricted attribute-levels to appear with equal probability within their applicable strata, the attribute-levels in provided in Table A1 appeared in profiles with the following probabilities:

- The unique levels of the applicant's gender, race/ethnicity, and community involvement appeared in the profiles with equal probability.
- For the languages spoken attribute, applicants were assigned "English" with a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ and one of the three bilingual options with a probability of $\frac{1}{6}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage, half of the applicants are identified as monolingual and half are identified as bilingual.
- For previous lobbying employment, applicants were assigned "None" with a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$ and "Less than 5 years in [real estate/tax] policy", "5-10 years in [real estate/tax] policy", "More than 10 years in [real estate/tax] policy", "Less than 5 years in [defense/education] policy", "5-10 years in

[defense/education] policy", and "More than 10 years in [defense/education] policy" with a probability of $\frac{1}{9}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage for policy expertise, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicant have no lobbying experience, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have experience in the organization's substantive field of expertise, and $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have experience in a substantive field other than that of the organization's expertise. Further, at the analysis stage for length of time of lobbying experience, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have no experience, $\frac{2}{9}$ have less than 5 years of experience, $\frac{2}{9}$ have 5-10 years of experience, and $\frac{2}{9}$ have more than 10 years of experience.

- For the previous political employment attribute, applicants were assigned "None" with a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$, "Director of Domestic Policy for a Liberal Think Tank" or "Director of Domestic Policy for a Conservative Think Tank" with a probability of $\frac{1}{6}$ each, and "Legislative Director for a Democratic House Member," "Communications Director for a Democratic House Member," "Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Democrats," "Legislative Director for a Republican House Member," "Communications Director for a Republican House Member," and "Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Republicans" with a probability of $\frac{1}{18}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have no previous political employment, $\frac{1}{3}$ have experience at a think tank, and $\frac{1}{3}$ have experience in one of the three congressional staff roles (with equal probability in each role), and applicants with think tank or congressional experience have an equal probability of being associated with Democrats/liberals or Republicans/conservatives.

Table A1: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels

Attribute	Levels	Restrictions?
Gender	Male (baseline)	None
	Female	None
Race/Ethnicity	White (baseline)	None
	Black	None
	Hispanic/Latino	None
	Asian	None
Languages Spoken	English (baseline)	None
	English, [Spanish, Portuguese]	None
	English, [French, German]	None
	English, [Chinese, Japanese]	None
Community Involvement	None (baseline)	None
	Volunteer at local food bank	None
	Docent at local museum	None
	Youth sports coach	None
Previous Lobbying Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Less than 5 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	5-10 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	More than 15 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	Less than 5 years in [defense/education] policy	None
	5-10 years in [defense/education] policy	None
	More than 15 years in [defense/education] policy	None
Previous Political Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Director of Domestic Policy for a Conservative Think Tank	None
	Director of Domestic Policy for a Liberal Think Tank	None
	Legislative Director for a Republican House member	None
	Legislative Director for a Democratic House member	None
	Communications Director for a Republican House member	None
	Communications Director for a Democratic House member	None
	Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Republicans	None
	Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Democrats	None

Table presents the attributes, attribute-levels, and attribute-level restrictions for each of the six characteristics included in the applicants' resume summaries used in the conjoint experiment tasks. In each task, respondents are presented with three profiles which consist of randomly assigned levels for each of the six attributes; unless otherwise noted in the table, attribute-level assignments are completely randomized (i.e. no restrictions conditional on assignment of other attribute-levels). The ordering of the attributes is also randomized across respondents and tasks. Where elements of attribute-levels appear in brackets, the first element in brackets can appear when the policy specialty of the hiring organization is real estate policy, and the second element in brackets can appear when the policy specialty of the hiring organization is tax policy.

Table A2: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Recoded)

Attribute	Levels	Restrictions?
Gender	Male (baseline)	None
	Female	None
Race/Ethnicity	White (baseline)	None
	Black	None
	Hispanic/Latino	None
	Asian	None
Languages Spoken	English Only (baseline)	None
	Bilingual	None
Community Involvement	None (baseline)	None
	Volunteer at local food bank	None
	Docent at local museum	None
	Youth sports coach	None
Years of Lobbying Experience	None (baseline)	None
	<5 years	None
	5-10 years	None
	>15 years	None
Policy-Relevant Lobbying Experience	No	None
	Yes	Years of Lobbying Exp. must not be "None"
Previous Political Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Think tank	None
	Congress	None
	Legislative director	None
	Communications director	None
	Committee staff	None
Ideological/Partisan Alignment of Applicant/Organization	Indeterminate	Prev. Pol. Emp. must be "None"
	Match	Prev. Pol. Emp. must not be "None"
	Mismatch	Prev. Pol. Emp. must not be "None"

Table presents the attributes, attribute-levels, and attribute-level restrictions for each of the ten characteristics extracted from the applicants' resume summaries present in the conjoint experiment tasks. Unless otherwise noted in the table, attribute-level assignments are completely randomized (i.e. no restrictions conditional on assignment of other attribute-levels). For the original codings of attribute-levels, please see Table A1.

B Sampling Procedure and Descriptive Statistics

Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) and subsequent amendments, individuals who meet the thresholds for designation as a lobbyist must complete and submit a quarterly report, known as an LD-2 form, for each of their clients detailing their lobbying activities on behalf of the client. The sampling frame for our survey is the full universe of individuals listed as 1) lobbyists 2) or points of contact on quarterly LD-2 reports from the first quarter of 2019 through the third quarter of 2020.

- **Registered Lobbyists** Under the LDA, a lobbyist is an individual who, in working on behalf of a client, makes a "lobbying contact," or an "oral, written, or electronic communication" regarding the conduct of public policy, with more than one "covered official," which includes most members of the executive and legislative branches—include the president, vice-president, and members of Congress—and spends 20 percent or more of her time working for the client on lobbying activities within a quarterly period. As of January 2017, a lobbyist employed directly by a client that spends $13,000 or more, or a lobbyist contracted by a client that spends $3,000 or more on lobbying activities in a given quarter, is required to file an LD-2 report (or be listed as a lobbyist on their organization's LD-2 form) for that quarter.

- **Points of contact** Each LD-2 report identifies a point of contact for the lobbyist or for the organization employing the lobbyist, or the registrant. While this point of contact can be an individual who is not a registered lobbyist under the LDA, the vast majority of points of contact are LDA lobbyists, and those individuals who are not LDA lobbyists often perform government relations or policy advocacy functions and are familiar with lobbying activity (see Miller 2021).

For each individual, his or her most recent appearance on a report was selected so as to obtain the most up-to-date contact and employment information; in cases where the same

individual appeared on more than one LD-2 report in a given quarter, one report on which that individual appeared as the point of contact was randomly sampled to be associated with that individual.

While each LD-2 report provides an email address for the designated point of contact, it does not provide email addresses for the registered lobbyists listed on that LD-2 report who are not the point of contact.[27] To expand the size of our sample and to include more potential respondents who are themselves registered lobbyists, we assumed that the email addresses of the lobbyists followed the same format as the email address provided for the point of contact and imputed for those lobbyists email addresses following the organization's apparent format; for instance, if the point of contact's email address was "`[first name].[last name]@[organization name].com`," we assumed that the lobbyists' email addresses were similar in structure and used the names provided to impute email addresses of the same pattern. After combining the email addresses imputed for lobbyists with those provided on LD-2 forms for points of contact and de-duplicating the list of individuals and email addresses, our final sampling frame consisted of 14,404 lobbyists and points of contact.

Initial survey invitations were distributed to all 14,404 unique recipients on December 1, 2021 and reminders were sent to all persons who had not yet completed the survey on December 10, December 21, and between December 27 and January 3 . The email addresses for 3,063 intended recipients were deemed invalid when initial invitations were sent, leaving a sampling frame of 11,341 lobbyists and points of contact and an overall response rate of 7.8% $\frac{888}{11341}$. This response rate compares favorably to those achieved in other survey experiments of American political elites (see Miller 2021).

It is difficult to assess the representativeness of our respondents to the lobbyists and points of contact in the sampling frame because scant systematic information is available regarding

[27]While most email addresses provided for points of contact are unique, some lobbying firms provide generic email addresses for all reports they file (e.g., LDA@Venable.com). To minimize email bounces and improve response rates, we identified instances in which generic email addresses were used and made every effort was made to obtain a unique email address for that individual (searching the organization website, LinkedIn, other social media platforms, etc.).

them and the clients for which they work; unlike more publicly visible political actors in Washington, DC, such as members of Congress, whose personal information is collated in the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress and can be systematically coded for inclusion in research, no central repository for similar personal information, such as partisanship and career history, exist for lobbyists and policy advocates. However, four pieces of information about the lobbyists and points of contact and their clients can be gleaned from their LDA filings and the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which cleans and aggregates the LDA filings: the client's quarterly lobbying expenditures with that lobbyist or point of contact's employer (i.e. the client's own expenditures if the lobbyist or point of contact is employed directly, or the client's expenditures with a given firm if the lobbyist or point of contact is a contract employee); whether the filer is the client or a lobbying firm contracted by a client; the client's sector coding, as assigned by CRP; and whether the person, if a point of contact, is also a registered lobbyist under the LDA.[28] Table A3 compares the distribution of these four characteristics in both the full sampling frame and the sample of respondents who took part in the experiment. These comparisons reveal differences for two of the four characteristics (Lobbying Expenditures and CRP Category) that are substantively small but statistically distinguishable at the $p < 0.05$ level.[29] Thus, while the sample of respondents differs from the sampling frame, it contains a sizable number of respondents with each unique level of these characteristics.[30]

[28]The first three of these pieces of information are easily observable from CRP's aggregated LDA filings, but the fourth can only be determined by assessing whether points of contact listed on LD-2 forms are also listed as registered lobbyists. To determine whether each point of contact is also a registered lobbyist, I used approximate matching techniques to compare the name of the point of contact on each LDA filing to the names of all of the registered lobbyists also appearing on the filing, and visually inspected the best match for each LDA form to determine if the point of contact was also listed as a registered lobbyist.

[29]The $|t|$ and χ^2 test statistics from the difference in means and χ^2 tests are: $|t| = 1.00$ for Lobbyist Employer; $\chi^2_3 = 61.33$ for Lobbying Expenditures; $\chi^2_{13} = 51.33$ for CRP Category; and $|t| = 1.96$ for Registered Lobbyist.

[30]To account for these differences between our sample and the sampling frame, we also replicated our analyses by weighting our observations to mirror the distribution of these four characteristics in the sampling frame. These analyses (not shown) are substantively similar; the point estimates closely resemble those presented here, though the confidence intervals widen and decrease our statistical power in a few cases.

Finally, Table A4 provides information on the descriptive characteristics of the individuals who completed conjoint experiment tasks. This descriptive information was collected as part of the survey, and thus only provides information about respondents. The high proportions of respondents who report education levels of "post-graduate degree" (68.1%), income levels of "$200,000 or more" (58.1%), experience levels of "more than 20 years" (41.1%), and professional roles as "lobbyists" or "executive officers responsible for lobbying" (88.6%) suggest that most survey respondents were themselves members of the population of interest—political elites who play a substantive role in lobbying and policy advocacy—rather than low-level employees who may respond to emails but lack significant lobbying experience. Further, that the majority of respondents indicated that they are "Always" involved in their organization's hiring of new lobbyists (508 respondents, or 57.2%), and that most respondents reported being "Sometimes," "Often," or "Always" involved in hiring (752 respondents, or 84.7%), indicates that our respondents have the requisite knowledge and expertise to complete our conjoint hiring tasks.

Sample Descriptive Statistics

Table A3: Comparison of Respondents with Sampling Frame

Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)	% of Sampling Frame (N)
Employer Type		
Client	54.4% (483)	56.0% (6350)
Firm	45.6% (405)	44.0% (4991)
Lobbying Expenditures		
First Quartile	32.4% (288)	25.0% (2836)
Second Quartile	29.3% (260)	25.0% (2835)
Third Quartile	22.1% (196)	25.0% (2835)
Fourth Quartile	16.2% (144)	25.0% (2835)
CRP Category		
Agribusiness	5.1% (45)	4.1% (468)
Communications and Electronics	6.5% (58)	7.5% (853)
Construction	1.0% (9)	2.0% (231)
Defense	0.9% (8)	1.8% (199)
Energy and Natural Resources	6.0% (53)	7.1% (807)
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	7.2% (64)	10.6% (1198)
Health	19.4% (172)	19.6% (2218)
Ideological and Single-Issue	12.6% (112)	10.0% (1132)
Labor	2.6% (23)	2.2% (247)
Lawyers and Lobbyists	1.4% (12)	0.6% (69)
Misc Business	11.5% (102)	12.7% (1445)
Other	6.9% (61)	5.7% (642)
Transportation	7.4% (66)	7.1% (807)
Unknown	11.6% (103)	9.0% (1025)
Registered Lobbyist		
Yes	77.9% (692)	75.3% (8540)
No	22.1% (196)	24.7% (2801)

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents

Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)
Gender	
Female	32.4% (288)
Male	67.5% (599)
NA	0.1% (1)
Age	
18-29	7.2% (64)
30-49	39.2% (348)
50-64	38.0% (337)
65 or over	15.3% (136)
NA	0.3% (3)
Education	
Some college, no 4-year degree	1.5% (13)
College graduate	35.0% (311)
Post-graduate degree	63.4% (563)
NA	0.1% (1)
Race	
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.2% (2)
Asian	1.6% (14)
Black or African-American	3.0% (27)
White	91.6% (813)
Other	3.0% (27)
NA	0.6% (5)
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?	
Yes	3.6% (32)
No	95.4% (847)
NA	1.0% (9)
Income	
Less than $25,000	0.1% (1)
$25,000-$49,999	0.3% (3)
$50,000-$74,999	4.5% (40)
$75,000-$99,999	4.4% (39)
$100,000-$199,999	21.1% (187)
$200,000 or more	67.2% (597)
NA	2.4% (21)
Ideology	
Very liberal	14.0% (124)
Somewhat liberal	26.7% (237)
Slightly liberal	14.9% (132)

Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)
Neither liberal nor conservative	12.5% (111)
Slightly conservative	10.9% (97)
Somewhat conservative	15.2% (135)
Very conservative	5.3% (47)
NA	0.6% (5)
Party Identification	
Strong Democrat	44.6% (396)
Not a very strong Democrat	9.8% (87)
Lean Democrat	7.0% (62)
Independent	6.9% (61)
Lean Republican	4.8% (43)
Not a very strong Republican	9.7% (86)
Strong Republican	14.5% (129)
Other	2.4% (21)
NA	0.3% (3)
Lobbying Experience	
Less than 5 years	11.6% (103)
5-10 years	18.8% (167)
11-15 years	17.3% (154)
16-20 years	14.6% (130)
More than 20 years	37.5% (333)
NA	0.1% (1)
Past Government Experience	
Member of Congress	4.8% (43)
Congressional staffer	47.3% (420)
Presidential appointee	8.7% (77)
EOP staffer	4.2% (37)
Civil servant	12.3% (109)
Other	10.8% (96)
No experience	31.9% (283)
Current Role with Client	
Lobbyist	68.5% (608)
Executive officer responsible for lobbying	23.1% (205)
Executive officer not responsible for lobbying	3.3% (29)
Other	4.4% (39)
NA	0.8% (7)
Frequency of Involvment in Hiring Lobbyists	
Never	6.9% (61)

Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)
Rarely	5.6% (50)
Sometimes	13.2% (117)
Often	14.3% (127)
Always	57.2% (508)
NA	2.8% (25)

C Empirical Results

Table A5: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, All Profiles)

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender		
Male (baseline)	-	-
Female	0.06* (0.01)	[0.02, 0.09]
Race		
White (baseline)	-	-
Black	0.08* (0.02)	[0.03, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.07* (0.02)	[0.02, 0.12]
Asian	0.01 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.06]
Bilingual		
No (baseline)	-	-
Yes	-0.00 (0.01)	[-0.04, 0.03]
Community Involvement		
None (baseline)	-	-
Museum docent	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.03, 0.07]
Youth sports coach	0.03 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.08]
Food bank volunteer	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.01, 0.09]
Years of Lobbying Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
< 5 years	-0.05 (0.02)	[-0.11, 0.01]

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
5-10 years	0.06 (0.02)	[-0.00, 0.11]
$>$ 10 years	0.09* (0.02)	[0.04, 0.15]
Policy Alignment		
No policy match (baseline)	-	-
Policy match	0.32* (0.01)	[0.27, 0.36]
Ideological Alignment		
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-
Aligned	0.01 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.06]
Misaligned	-0.05^* (0.02)	[-0.10, -0.00]
Political Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.11* (0.02)	[0.06, 0.16]
Comms. Director	0.15* (0.02)	[0.08, 0.22]
Leg. Director	0.24* (0.02)	[0.17, 0.31]
Committee Staff	0.42* (0.02)	[0.35, 0.49]

Number of observations=5223 (888 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) presented in Figures 1 and 2 which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as as an interview candidate. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^*p < 0.0018$.

Table A6: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Ordinal Rating, All Profiles)

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender		
Male (baseline)	-	-
Female	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.02, 0.17]
Race		
White (baseline)	-	-
Black	0.11 (0.04)	[-0.02, 0.25]

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Hispanic	0.15* (0.05)	[0.01, 0.29]
Asian	0.00 (0.04)	[-0.13, 0.14]
Bilingual		
No (baseline)	-	-
Yes	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.09, 0.10]
Community Involvement		
None (baseline)	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.17]
Youth sports coach	0.10 (0.04)	[-0.03, 0.24]
Food bank volunteer	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.05, 0.23]
Years of Lobbying Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
< 5 years	-0.01 (0.06)	[-0.17, 0.15]
5-10 years	0.38* (0.06)	[0.22, 0.55]
> 10 years	0.41* (0.06)	[0.24, 0.58]
Policy Alignment		
No policy match (baseline)	-	-
Policy match	0.97* (0.04)	[0.84, 1.09]
Ideological Alignment		
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-
Aligned	0.12 (0.06)	[-0.04, 0.28]
Misaligned	-0.22^* (0.05)	[-0.38, -0.06]
Political Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.61* (0.06)	[0.45, 0.78]
Comms. Director	0.65* (0.07)	[0.45, 0.86]
Leg. Director	0.97* (0.07)	[0.76, 1.17]
Committee Staff	1.40* (0.07)	[1.20, 1.60]

Number of observations=5348 (902 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) indicating the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on respondents' five-point ordinal ratings of interview candidates. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^{*}p < 0.0018$.

Table A7: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Respondent Ideology)

	Liberals		Conservatives	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender				
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Female	0.06* (0.02)	[0.01, 0.11]	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.09]
Race				
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Black	0.10* (0.02)	[0.03, 0.17]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.07* (0.02)	[0.00, 0.14]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.08, 0.10]
Asian	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.09]	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.15]
Bilingual				
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.01 (0.01)	[-0.04, 0.05]	-0.01 (0.02)	[-0.07, 0.06]
Community Involvement				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.10]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.03, 0.14]
Youth sports coach	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.03, 0.10]	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.07, 0.12]
Food bank volunteer	0.05 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.11]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.14]
Years of Lobbying Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
< 5 years	-0.04 (0.03)	[-0.12, 0.04]	-0.05 (0.03)	[-0.15, 0.05]
5-10 years	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.01, 0.15]	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.06, 0.15]

	Liberals		Conservatives	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
$>$ 10 years	0.09* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.17]	0.12* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.22]
Policy Alignment				
No policy match (baseline)	-	-		
Policy match	0.33* (0.02)	[0.27, 0.38]	0.29* (0.03)	[0.22, 0.37]
Ideological Alignment				
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Aligned	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.08]	0.03 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.12]
Misaligned	-0.06 (0.02)	[-0.12, 0.00]	-0.05 (0.03)	[-0.13, 0.03]
Political Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.13* (0.02)	[0.07, 0.19]	0.10* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.19]
Comms. Director	0.18* (0.03)	[0.09, 0.27]	0.17* (0.04)	[0.05, 0.29]
Leg. Director	0.28* (0.03)	[0.19, 0.37]	0.25* (0.04)	[0.13, 0.38]
Committee Staff	0.45* (0.03)	[0.36, 0.55]	0.43* (0.04)	[0.31, 0.55]

Number of observations=4548 (772 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as as an interview candidate conditioned by the respondent's self-reported ideology on a seven-point scale (those answering "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," or "slightly liberal" are recoded here as "Liberal," and those answering "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," or "slightly conservative" are recoded here as "Conservative"). AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^*p < 0.0018$.

Table A8: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Respondent Ideology, Only Among Ideologically Compatible Respondents)

	Liberals		Conservatives	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender				
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Female	0.08 (0.03)	[-0.00, 0.16]	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.17]
Race				
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Black	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.03, 0.20]	-0.03 (0.05)	[-0.20, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.21]	-0.03 (0.06)	[-0.21, 0.14]
Asian	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.15]	-0.06 (0.05)	[-0.22, 0.11]
Bilingual				
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.10]	-0.04 (0.04)	[-0.16, 0.08]
Community Involvement				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.07, 0.15]	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.23]
Youth sports coach	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.09, 0.14]	0.05 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.19]
Food bank volunteer	0.05 (0.04)	[-0.06, 0.17]	0.11 (0.05)	[-0.04, 0.25]
Years of Lobbying Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
< 5 years	-0.03 (0.05)	[-0.17, 0.11]	-0.12 (0.07)	[-0.31, 0.06]
5-10 years	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.07, 0.20]	-0.05 (0.07)	[-0.24, 0.14]
> 10 years	0.08 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.20]	0.09 (0.06)	[-0.08, 0.25]
Policy Alignment				
No policy match (baseline)	-	-		
Policy match	0.33* (0.03)	[0.24, 0.42]	0.30* (0.04)	[0.17, 0.42]
Political Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.15]	0.00 (0.05)	[-0.14, 0.14]
Comms. Director	0.14 (0.05)	[-0.01, 0.30]	0.05 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.25]
Leg. Director	0.21* (0.04)	[0.17, 0.34]	0.19 (0.08)	[-0.05, 0.43]

	Liberals		Conservatives	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Committee Staff	0.43* (0.05)	[0.29, 0.57]	0.45* (0.07)	[0.23, 0.67]

Number of observations=1536 (424 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as as an interview candidate conditioned by the respondent's self-reported ideology on a seven-point scale (those answering "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," or "slightly liberal" are recoded here as "Liberal," and those answering "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," or "slightly conservative" are recoded here as "Conservative"). This analysis subsets to only respondent-tasks in which the respondent was assigned to imagine working for an organization whose ideology matches their own (e.g., a "somewhat liberal" respondent assigned to a "liberal" organization). Due to this subsetting, which restricts us to organizations assigned to be either liberal or conservative, we induce collinearity between our Ideological Alignment and Political Experience attributes (since all applicants with political experience are either Aligned or Misaligned with the organization's ideology); due to this, we omit our Ideological Alignment attribute from this analysis. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^{*}p < 0.0018$.

Table A9: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Applicant Ideological Match with Hiring Organization, Only Among Liberal Respondents)

	Indeterminate		Mismatch		Match	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender						
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	0.00 (0.03)	[-0.10, 0.11]	0.03 (0.03)	[-0.07, 0.13]	0.11* (0.04)	[0.00, 0.23]
Race						
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Black	0.09 (0.05)	[-0.06, 0.24]	0.12 (0.05)	[-0.02, 0.26]	0.09 (0.05)	[-0.08, 0.26]
Hispanic	0.06 (0.05)	[-0.08, 0.20]	0.08 (0.05)	[-0.08, 0.23]	0.10 (0.05)	[-0.07, 0.27]
Asian	0.04 (0.05)	[-0.11, 0.18]	0.02 (0.05)	[-0.13, 0.17]	0.01 (0.05)	[-0.16, 0.17]
Bilingual						
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.10, 0.11]	-0.00 (.)	[-0.11, 0.10]	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.09, 0.14]
Community Involvement						
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.05)	[-0.12, 0.17]	0.04 (0.06)	[-0.11, 0.19]	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.24]
Youth sports coach	0.08 (0.05)	[-0.07, 0.22]	-0.00 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.15]	0.06 (0.05)	[-0.04, 0.27]
Food bank volunteer	0.08 (0.05)	[-0.06, 0.22]	-0.00 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.14]	0.12 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.21]
Years of Lobbying Experience						
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
$<$ 5 years	0.07 (0.06)	[-0.10, 0.24]	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.22, 0.12]	-0.08 (0.06)	[-0.27, 0.10]
5-10 years	0.20* (0.06)	[0.03, 0.37]	-0.02 (0.06)	[-0.18, 0.15]	0.07 (0.06)	[-0.11, 0.25]
$>$ 10 years	0.25* (0.06)	[0.09, 0.41]	0.09 (0.06)	[-0.07, 0.26]	-0.01 (0.06)	[-0.19, 0.17]
Policy Alignment						
No policy match (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Policy match	0.33* (0.04)	[0.21, 0.46]	0.30* (0.04)	[0.19, 0.41]	0.36* (0.04)	[0.25, 0.48]
Political Experience						
Think Tank Director (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Comms. Director	0.03 (0.05)	[-0.13, 0.18]	0.02 (0.05)	[-0.14, 0.18]	0.08 (0.05)	[-0.08, 0.23]
Leg. Director	0.18* (0.05)	[0.03, 0.33]	0.12 (0.05)	[-0.03, 0.27]	0.13 (0.05)	[-0.04, 0.29]
Committee Staff	0.29* (0.05)	[0.13, 0.45]	0.36* (0.05)	[0.20, 0.51]	0.31* (0.05)	[0.15, 0.47]

Number of observations=2916 (493 unique respondents). This table presents the average component interaction effects (ACIEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as as an interview candidate conditioned by whether the applicant's background is ideologically aligned with the hiring organization among liberal respondents (those respondents answering "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," or "slightly liberal"). Due to this subsetting, we induce collinearity between our Ideological Alignment and Political Experience attributes (since all applicants with political experience are either Aligned or Misaligned with the organization's ideology); due to this, we omit our Ideological Alignment attribute from this analysis. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^{*}p < 0.0018$.

Table A10: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Applicant Ideological Match with Hiring Organization, Only Among Conservative Respondents)

	Indeterminate		Mismatch		Match	
Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender						
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.12, 0.15]	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.17]	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.10, 0.23]
Race						
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Black	0.06 (0.06)	[-0.12, 0.24]	0.12 (0.06)	[-0.07, 0.30]	-0.02 (0.09)	[-0.29, 0.25]
Hispanic	0.11 (0.06)	[-0.09, 0.30]	0.07 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.28]	-0.00 (0.08)	[-0.26, 0.25]
Asian	0.02 (0.06)	[-0.16, 0.21]	-0.02 (0.06)	[-0.22, 0.17]	-0.06 (0.07)	[-0.28, 0.17]
Bilingual						
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.17]	-0.09 (0.05)	[-0.25, 0.06]	0.09 (0.06)	[-0.09, 0.27]
Community Involvement						
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.06)	[-0.16, 0.21]	0.22* (0.06)	[0.02, 0.41]	-0.06 (0.07)	[-0.29, 0.16]
Youth sports coach	0.02 (0.06)	[-0.18, 0.21]	0.02 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.20]	-0.02 (0.07)	[-0.25, 0.21]
Food bank volunteer	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.24, 0.15]	0.12 (0.06)	[-0.08, 0.31]	0.06 (0.07)	[-0.17, 0.29]
Years of Lobbying Experience						
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
$<$ 5 years	-0.05 (0.07)	[-0.25, 0.16]	-0.12 (0.07)	[-0.33, 0.10]	-0.01 (0.09)	[-0.27, 0.25]
5-10 years	0.11 (0.08)	[-0.12, 0.33]	-0.04 (0.07)	[-0.25, 0.17]	0.01 (0.09)	[-0.26, 0.29]
$>$ 10 years	0.07 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.29]	0.02 (0.08)	[-0.22, 0.25]	0.15 (0.09)	[-0.10, 0.41]
Policy Alignment						
No policy match (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Policy match	0.35* (0.05)	[0.20, 0.49]	0.22* (0.05)	[0.07, 0.37]	0.26* (0.06)	[0.08, 0.44]
Political Experience						
Think Tank Director (baseline)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Comms. Director	0.12 (0.06)	[-0.07, 0.31]	0.09 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.31]	-0.01 (0.08)	[-0.24, 0.23]
Leg. Director	0.20* (0.06)	[0.01, 0.39]	0.14 (0.06)	[-0.07, 0.34]	0.09 (0.08)	[-0.15, 0.33]
Committee Staff	0.36* (0.06)	[0.17, 0.54]	0.44* (0.06)	[0.24, 0.64]	0.16 (0.08)	[-0.09, 0.41]

Number of observations=1632 (279 unique respondents). This table presents the average component interaction effects (ACIEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as as an interview candidate conditioned by whether the applicant's background is ideologically aligned with the hiring organization among conservative respondents (those respondents answering "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," or "slightly conservative"). Due to this subsetting, we induce collinearity between our Ideological Alignment and Political Experience attributes (since all applicants with political experience are either Aligned or Misaligned with the organization's ideology); due to this, we omit our Ideological Alignment attribute from this analysis. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^*p < 0.0018$.

Table A11: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Only Profiles Evaluated by Respondents Whose Ideology Does not Conflict with with the Hiring Organization)

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender		
Male (baseline)	-	-
Female	0.05* (0.01)	[0.01, 0.10]
Race		
White (baseline)	-	-
Black	0.07* (0.02)	[0.01, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.07* (0.02)	[0.01, 0.13]
Asian	0.01 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.07]
Bilingual		
No (baseline)	-	-
Yes	-0.00 (0.01)	[-0.05, 0.04]
Community Involvement		
None (baseline)	-	-
Museum docent	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.08]
Youth sports coach	0.03 (0.02)	[-0.03, 0.09]
Food bank volunteer	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.10]
Years of Lobbying Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
< 5 years	-0.05 (0.02)	[-0.12, 0.02]
5-10 years	0.07 (0.02)	[-0.00, 0.14]
> 10 years	0.10 (0.02)	[0.04, 0.17]
Policy Alignment		
No policy match (baseline)	-	-
Policy match	0.32* (0.02)	[0.27, 0.37]
Ideological Alignment		
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-
Aligned	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.08]
Misaligned	-0.06 (0.02)	[-0.11, -0.01]
Political Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Think Tank Director	0.11* (0.02)	[0.06, 0.16]
Comms. Director	0.17* (0.03)	[0.09, 0.25]
Leg. Director	0.26* (0.03)	[0.18, 0.34]
Committee Staff	0.44* (0.02)	[0.37, 0.52]

Number of observations=3144 (696 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) estimated among only respondents who were not assigned to imagine working for an organization whose ideology conflicts with their own (e.g., liberal respondents asked to imagine working for conservative organizations, conservative respondents asked to imagine working for liberal organizations). AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis signficance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). $^*p < 0.0018$.

D Race and Gender Estimation

For the descriptive figures in the manuscript, we impute the race of the lobbyist for individuals without a race designated by Legistorm. We can use the Legistorm-coded race of lobbyists ($n = 21,068$ unique lobbyists) to determine the accuracy of the estimation done through the `wru` (Khanna, Imai, and Khanna 2019) package. In general the estimation procedure is quite accurate, achieving 91.4% correct estimates. Table A12 displays the results of a more detailed examination through comparing the Legistorm-coded race to the estimated race for the same individuals. The N column shows the number of individuals that were estimated, for example, as Hispanic when their true (Legistorm) race is White. The `wru` software performs quite well across races with the major exception in estimating Black lobbyists as races other than Black, especially White.

Table A12: Race Estimation

Legistorm Race	Estimated Race	N
Asian	Asian	453
Asian	Black	4
Asian	Hispanic	6
Asian	White	167
Black	Asian	9
Black	Black	186
Black	Hispanic	10
Black	Other	2
Black	White	869
Hispanic	Asian	9
Hispanic	Black	2
Hispanic	Hispanic	395
Hispanic	White	131
White	Asian	112
White	Black	243
White	Hispanic	234
White	Other	9
White	White	18227

We include two figures (Figures A1 and A2) below that compare directly to Figures 1b and 3 in the main text. However, these figures subset to only those lobbyists with Legistorm-coded race. While the estimation procedure does miss the estimate for some individuals' race, the overall patterns shown with the estimated numbers are still in evidence using only the Legistorm-coded subsample.

Figure A1: Proportion of White Lobbyists – Legistorm Subsample



Figure A2: Proportion of White Lobbyists by Ideology – Legistorm Subsample



Dropping Issue-Specific Groups

Figures A3 displays the same gender-ideology trends in the manuscript, however we exclude from these calculates women's issues groups (as coded by issue area using the Center for Responsive Politics' issue area categorization). This demonstrates that it is not just a preponderance of left-leaning women's issues groups that is driving the ideological disparity in lobbyists' gender proportions. Similarly, Figure A4 displays the same figure for non-white lobbyists, dropping lobbying groups with the civil rights issue area. Again, there is no discernible difference from the original figure.

Figure A3: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Ideology – Dropping Women's Issues Groups



Figure A4: Proportion of Non-White Lobbyists by Ideology – Dropping Civil Rights Groups



Race and Gender by Industry

Figure A5: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry



Figure A6: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry: Health Sector



Figure A7: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry: Ideological / Single-Issue



Figure A8: Proportion of Non-White Lobbyists by Industry



E Correlations between Group Ideology Scales

While there are a number of reasons to prefer our lobbyist perception scores in this context, the scores should ideally be strongly correlated with other measurement strategies for the subset of groups that have valid scores on two or more scales. In Figure A9, we show the pairwise correlations between our perception-based scores and CFScores and IGScores, respectively. The scores correlate relatively strongly. While they do also differ substantially in respect to some groups, all scores measure very different dimensions of ideology: CFscores measure something close to electoral ideology, whereas IGscores are closer to ideal points on policy-making. On the other hand, the perception scores target a more holistic measure of liberal-conservative ideology. Therefore, some degree of disagreement is desirable.



Figure A9: Correlating CFscores and IGscores with Lobbyist Perceptions of Interest Group Preferences. **Note:** The fitted line is a LOESS smoother. Dashed, 45° line indicates perfect association. The Pearson's correlations are printed in the top-left corner of each panel.

To provide a benchmark to compare these correlations against, Figure A10 shows the pairwise correlation between CFscores and IGscores. As we can see, the average correlation is similar to the ones we obtain above, however, there is much stronger disagreement on the

extremes of the ideological spectrum.

Overall, this reassures us that our scores capture interest group ideology.



Figure A10: Correlation Between CFscores and IGscores. **Note:** The Pearson's correlation is printed in the top-left corner. The fitted line is a LOESS smoother.

F Did Respondents Guess the Study's Purpose?

Even though the conjoint design in general is effective in eliminating demand effects (Mummolo and Peterson 2019; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), one can always worry in any particular design. To gauge whether the respondents were able to guess the purpose of the study, we use the responses to an open-ended question after the hiring experiment, where we asked the respondents to comment, generally, on the hiring process, and if we were missing anything. We read through the comments and induced three groups of open-ended remarks: the applicant's 1) gender/race, 2) connections to members of Congress and Hill staff, and 3) education, reputation and previous (non-Hill) experience and expertise.

Figure A11 show the proportion of respondents that remark on each – we subset to include only respondents that gave an open-ended remark. Only 24 respondents remarked on anything related to race or gender. This corresponds to 5% of the respondents that responded to the open-ended question. This contrasts with 13% commenting on Hill experience and 46% commenting on education, reputation and previous (non-Hill) experience and expertise. Overall, it does not seem that many of the respondents were attentive to the fact that race and gender was on the applicant's resume.



Figure A11: How Many Ask about Gender or Race? **Note:** The figure shows the proportion of respondents commenting on race or gender conditional on having written an open-ended remark about gender/race, connections to people working on the Hill, and the applicant's education, reputation and previous experience/expertise.

Table A13 presents four examples of respondents that remarked on gender and/or race. When delving into the content of the open-ended remarks, it does not seem that the respondents have guessed the purpose of the study. Rather, they typically provide input on what the hiring process really works, and the realism of having race or gender on the resume of an applicant.

Table A13: Examples of Comments about Race and Gender

	Comments
1	No one cares about community involvement. No one wants candidates who have not worked on the hill or don't have a close relationship with a key Member of Congress or an agency or the white house. No one cares much about gender or race. That is kind of offensive.
2	Look for Hill experience and attractive females. Staff members are less likely to say no to females. Your politics seldom comes into play - you are working for the client, liberal or conservative and you must play what you are dealt.
3	Our organization blinds resumes removing any information indicating the candidate's race, sexual orientation, gender, or political affiliation. While I would eventually learn some of this information during in-person interviews, our policy is intended to eliminate unconscious bias influencing those who reach that stage of the process.
4	Portfolio of issues worked while on the Hill or at an agency. Other relevant work experience. For instance, in the final hiring question, I was wondering why the applicant is applying to this job at all. Also, generally speaking, race isn't included in a resume and I find the idea of using that on the summaries of people's qualifications questionable.

References

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices Via Stated Preference Experiments." *Political Analysis* 22(1): 1–30.

Miller, David Ryan. 2021. "On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests' Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* .