

Lobbying Against Discrimination: The Effects of Race and Gender in Lobbyist Hiring Decisions

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Abstract

Government released data indicate a decreasing racial and gender gap among lobbyists in recent years, but women and minorities are still (substantially) underrepresented among federal lobbyists. These gender and racial differences are also greater among conservative leaning groups. What drives these trends? Although previous work has highlighted the relative scarcity of women and minorities in positions leading to lobbyist positions (supply), we know less about whether interest groups are interested in hiring qualified women and minorities for such positions (demand). Using a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of individuals involved in hiring lobbyists, we find greater demand for female and minority lobbyists than for their male and white counterparts, especially among ideological liberals. Our work shows that the lobbying industry does not appear to discount the candidacies of potential female and minority lobbyists.

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Ain't but two of us. One Democrat, one Republican.

—Fred McClure of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, when asked how many African-American lobbyists there are (Birnbaum 2006)

It is very challenging. It is still a boys' club out there.

—Karissa Willhite, principal at Ogilvy (Gangitano 2020)

Women and minorities are underrepresented as federal policymakers. They are less likely to hold public office (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Schaeffer 2021), to hold senior positions as congressional staffers (Ritchie and You 2021; Ziniel 2021), and are underrepresented in the federal bureaucracy (Bishu and Headley 2020; Naff 1998; Potter and Volden 2018). Yet, while evaluations of policy responsiveness and representation have focused almost exclusively on the role of those in government, many non-governmental actors also play an active and important role in the policy process. In particular, substantial evidence demonstrates the important role that lobbyists play in the development (Baumgartner et al. 2009), passage (Hall and Deardorff 2006), and implementation (Yackee 2006) of public policy.

Moreover, while lobbyists act for the organized interests they represent, they also enjoy an information advantage over the groups they represent and often have substantial agency regarding the specific actions they take to promote policies and shape legislation (Holyoke 2021; LaPira and Thomas 2014, 2017; Leech 2014; Miller et al. 2022; Schiff et al. 2015; Stephenson and Jackson 2010). As such, the identity of the lobbyist can have real effects on policy outcomes (Levine 2009). In particular, previous work has shown that male and female lobbyists act to shape the policy process in different ways (Lucas and Hyde 2012; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Schlozman 1990) and shapes the substantive policy representation of minorities and women more broadly (Nownes and Freeman 1998; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990; Strickland and Stauffer 2022).

In this paper, we first examine the representation of women and minorities among the ranks of federal lobbyists using data on lobbyists from the Lobbyist Disclosure Act reports

filed between 2001 and 2020. We confirm that minorities and women are underrepresented among lobbyists.¹ While documenting the underrepresentation of particular groups among lobbyists, we also show that these gaps have declined over recent years. Minorities and women represented four percent and 37 percent of lobbyists in 2001, respectively, they represent eight and 42 percent in more recent years. However, there are also substantial differences across groups. Drawing on new data of ideological placement of 1,400 organized groups that employ lobbyists, we show that this underrepresentation is starkest among organizations on the right of the ideological spectrum.

Second, we consider the extent to which interest groups are interested in hiring women and minorities for such positions. While previous work has documented extensively the lack of diversity among the professions that feed into lobbying (i.e. the lack of supply of potential female and minority lobbyists),² we know much less about the demand for female and minority lobbyists in the hiring process, which could also facilitate or hinder greater representation of minorities and women within lobbying organizations.

We investigate interest group demand for minority and women lobbyists using a conjoint

¹While previous work has regularly provided updates on gender disparities among lobbyists (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990; Strickland and Stauffer 2022), we are not aware of previous work that has looked at racial diversity among lobbyists at the federal level (but see Strickland and Tarr 2023 at the state level).

²Women and minorities are substantially underrepresented in many of the positions that give individuals the expertise and connections that qualify them for lobbying positions including elected officials (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Women Donors Network 2014), congressional staffers (Brenson 2020; Burgat 2017) and federal bureaucrats in leadership positions (Cornwell and Kellough 1994; Potter and Volden 2018), political campaign staffers (Chewning et al. 2022; Enos and Hersh 2015) and even lawyers (American Bar Association 2020).

survey experiment of political elites with intimate knowledge of and experience with the lobbyist hiring process—federal lobbyists and policy advocates.³ Our experiment simulates the hiring process by presenting respondents with job applicant profiles whose randomly-generated characteristics convey information about the applicants’ expertise, connections, and partisanship/ideology and asking them to indicate which applicant they would prefer to interview.⁴ Crucially, we also randomly assigned information about both the job applicant’s gender and race. This empirical approach enables us to isolate the independent causal effects of lobbyists’ gender and racial characteristics on hiring decisions and assess the relative magnitudes of those effects on the same scale as other attributes such as policy expertise and connections to legislative policymakers through past employment history.

Our results show that the demand for women and minorities as lobbyists is strong, and, in many instances, interest groups appear to prefer to interview women and minorities over their otherwise similar white and male counterparts. Overall, our results show that while both women and minorities are underrepresented in federal lobbyist positions, there is at the same time, some potential for optimism for greater diversity among lobbyists.

³The experiment was pre-registered at [redacted]. However, in that pre-registration, we did not pre-register expectations for the effects of women and minorities on hiring preferences.

⁴As we discuss further below, while interest in interviewing candidates is regularly used as a measure of employment discrimination (e.g. Quillian et al. 2017), the interview stage is only one step in the hiring process and groups may express interest in interviewing a diverse set of candidates but not hiring those candidates. However, we note that in this exercise, respondents were only allowed to select one candidate to interview rather than many candidates, making this exercise more like a hiring process. Moreover, the interview stage is a key filter in the hiring process that shapes the final pool from which employers can select and discrimination at the interview stage is correlated with discrimination at the hiring stage (Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort 1996; Neumark 2018; Quillian, Lee, and Oliver 2020; Riach and Rich 2002).

Importance of Lobbying Diversity

Women and minorities are not only underrepresented in elected office (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Schaeffer 2021) and in other areas of government (Bishu and Headley 2020; Ritchie and You 2021; Ziniel 2021), but their lack of representation among policymakers has substantial effects on the policies that government ultimately produces (Haynie 2001; Keiser et al. 2002; Swers 2002), and the representation of their interests in policy (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Grose 2011; Lowande, Ritchie, and Lauterbach 2019).⁵

The effects that race and gender of other policymakers have on policy outcomes strongly suggests a similar effect for lobbyists similarly involved in the policymaking process as individual lobbyists can have a strong influence on legislative outcomes. Although much of the work on the influence of lobbying on the legislative process has focused on the lobby organizations themselves rather than the identity of lobbyists, recent work indicates individual lobbyists have a significant influence on the policy process beyond the effects of the organized interest that employs their services (Furnas, Heaney, and LaPira n.d.; McCrain 2018; Strickland 2020). Rather than unitary actors, lobbyists are the agents of interest group principals and enjoy significant advantages in access to information and expertise (Drutman 2015; Kersh 2002) that allows them leeway in their actions (Holyoke 2021; LaPira and Thomas 2014, 2017; Leech 2014; Miller et al. 2022; Schiff et al. 2015; Stephenson and Jackson 2010).

Indeed, there is strong evidence that lobbyists' identities can shape policy outcomes (Levine 2009) and that there is substantial variation in organized groups' perceptions of individual lobbyists' effectiveness have on the effectiveness of individual lobbyist (Blanes i

⁵For example, female and minority legislators are more likely to sponsor legislation (e.g. Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001; Swers 2002; Wolbrecht 2000), and participate in the legislative process more generally (e.g. Dodson 2006; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Grose 2011) around issues particularly relevant to their underrepresented group.

Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012; McCrain 2018; Miller et al. 2022; Strickland and Stauffer 2022). Moreover, organizations not only work to hire the most effective lobbyists, but also prioritize the hiring of lobbyists with certain characteristics aimed at minimizing potential principal-agent problems (Miller et al. 2022). Thus, organizations recognize that lobbyist priorities and tactics, which can be informed by personal identities, beliefs, experiences, can have on policy outcomes.

In addition, while abundant evidence exists that racial and gender differences among individuals holding government office affects policy framing and substance, there is also some limited evidence that indicates that racial and gender diversity affects the lobbying process (Lucas and Hyde 2012; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Schlozman 1990, but see Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005).⁶ Moreover, previous work suggests that organized groups perceive differences in effectiveness in different policy making environments and vary the types of lobbyists they seek accordingly (Miller et al. 2022; Strickland and Stauffer 2022; Strickland and Tarr 2023).

Women and Minorities in Lobbying

In addition to extant work, scholarly and journalistic, speculating on how a diverse lobbying community would affect the means and substance of policy implementation at the federal level, previous studies suggest that women (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020) and minorities (Birnbaum 2006; Wolman and Thomas 1970) are underrepresented in the population of lobbyists. We should note, however, that while we

⁶While the quantitative evidence of substantive differences in the approaches and focus of minority and female lobbyists is limited, interview evidence suggest that women and minorities involved in the lobbying world are more focused on particular issues and approach the policy process differently (Levine 2009; Schlozman 1990; LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020).

are not aware of any scholarly work that explicitly examines the representation of minorities among the general lobbyist population, recent work suggests that they have historically been underrepresented at the state level (Strickland and Tarr 2023), and journalistic accounts suggest similar patterns exist at the federal level (Birnbaum 2006; Oprysko 2021). Simply, all indications suggest that lobbying is dominated by whites and by men.

What is less clear, however, is the extent to which demand (or lack thereof) for minorities and women as lobbyists plays into the lack of diversity in the lobbying community.⁷ Although not explicitly focusing on the supply of potential candidates for jobs in lobbying, previous work has documented extensively the racial and gender gaps in other key professions that feed into lobbying, including elected officials (Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Women Donors Network 2014), congressional staffers in leadership positions (Brenson 2020; Burgat 2017), federal bureaucrats in leadership positions (Cornwell and Kellough 1994; Potter and Volden 2018), political campaign staffers (Chewning et al. 2022; Enos and Hersh 2015) and even lawyers (American Bar Association 2020).

In addition, previous work has indicated that individuals previously excluded from politics (i.e. women and minorities) have lower levels of political ambition (Dynes et al. 2021; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2014; Preece and Stoddard 2015).⁸ Similarly, there is some evidence that suggests that women discount their abilities and are less likely to believe they will have the support necessary to pursue positions of power (Butler and Preece 2016; Lawless and Fox 2004, 2010). Simply, previous work suggests women and minorities are less likely to self-select into opportunities that would lead to a career as a lobbyist.

⁷While there is some evidence that the number of contracts given to female lobbyists (but not the total number of registered female lobbyists) might change as legislative circumstances change (Strickland and Stauffer 2022), it is not clear whether on average organizations have a preference for minority or female lobbyists relative to their white and male counterparts.

⁸Some work suggests that minorities have similar levels of political ambition but are less likely to realize that ambition (Shah 2015)

Moreover, there is some evidence that suggests that women and minorities select out of lobbying. Gender gaps among lobbyists are slightly, but not drastically, larger among lobbyists working for contract lobbying firms than among those who work in-house for an organization purportedly because of the differences in working conditions and expectations across these types of firms (LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020).⁹ However, the use of in-house or contract lobbyists by an organization is likely also correlated with a number of other factors that might also contribute to the propensity of an organization to hire women and minorities as lobbyists. For example, some research suggests anecdotally that women are more likely to be found working as lobbyists on gender related issues (LaPira, Marchetti, and Thomas 2020; Schlozman 1990). And there is older research on black lobbying efforts that suggests that groups likely to employ minority lobbyists were more focused on minority issues (Wolman and Thomas 1970).

However, there are also some reasons to believe that demand could contribute to (or mitigate) the lack of diversity among certain lobbying groups. Previous work suggests that the demand among political elites for greater representation of women and minorities among the ranks of policymakers has come primarily from liberal groups (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Fraga and Hassell 2021; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Kitchens and Swers 2016; Thomsen 2015; Thomsen and Swers 2017).¹⁰ On the whole, liberal groups and organizations are more likely to demand representation among women and minorities and we might expect similar effects among lobbying organizations.

⁹We are unaware of any work looking at minorities preferences for positions in lobbying.

¹⁰Doherty, Dowling, and Miller (2019) are slightly less positive in their evaluations of Democratic party chairs, finding consistent discrimination against minority candidates but also that those effects are attenuated among Democratic chairs depending on the demographic context of the district in which the candidate might be running.

The Demand for Minorities and Women

While it is fairly obvious that the supply of potential minority and female lobbyists is small and contributes to a lack of diversity among lobbyists, we know less about the demand for lobbyists among those who hire them. It is less clear whether racial and gender gaps are mitigated or extenuated by discriminatory hiring practices. On the one hand, there is significant evidence from other fields that people tend to hire and promote others like themselves which may slow gender and racial equality in traditionally male and white dominated fields (Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman 1998; Reskin 2000). Similarly, although some work has found that political elites do not inherently privilege whites and men (Fraga and Hassell 2021; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019) there is other work that has shown some evidence that political elites discriminate against minorities (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2019). On the other hand, both parties have indicated a desire to incorporate minority voices into the policy process (Republican National Committee 2013; Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018). In short, it is not clear whether women and minorities face discrimination in the hiring process that contributes to the gender and racial gaps among lobbyists or if there is greater demand for lobbyists who would bring greater diversity to the overall population of lobbyists.

Lobbyist Diversity or the Lack Thereof

We begin by examining the racial and gender diversity of lobbyists. In order to examine the representation of women and minorities among the ranks of federal lobbyists, we rely on quarterly reports filed in compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act and administered by the US House and Senate. We use a version of this data acquired from private data provider Legistorm, who performs a variety of cleaning processes to the raw data. Most importantly for our purposes, they create unique identifiers per lobbyist through rectifying name discrepancies from report to report. The full sample, from 2001-2020, includes 70,000

unique lobbyists from 11,765 lobbying organizations.


For a subset of the data, Legistorm collects race (30% of lobbyists) and gender (73% of lobbyists) information on the lobbyists. To fill in the race and gender for the remainder of the sample, we rely on the `wru` package in R to identify lobbyist race (Khanna, Imai, and Khanna 2019) and the `gender` package in R to identify lobbyist gender (Mullen, Blevins, and Schmidt 2018).¹¹

Figure 1 shows the proportion of female lobbyists and the proportion of lobbyists who are non-minority over time.¹² We note two things from this information. First, minorities and women are significantly underrepresented among lobbyists. Women make up between 37 and 42 percent of lobbyists and minorities make up between four and eight percent of lobbyists in the time period. Second, these numbers are increasing over time. While still drastically underrepresented, both underrepresented groups have been making inroads and increasing in number over the last twenty years.


Just looking at overall diversity, however, may mask important differences across the political spectrum in the representation of minorities and women among the ranks of federal lobbyists. To estimate group ideology, we use scores developed in Egerod et al. (2022). These ideological scales rely on survey responses by 888 federal lobbyists that are asked to place interest groups on a liberal-conservative ideological scale. Each lobbyist rates five groups,

¹¹These tools, widely in the social sciences for this purpose (e.g. Barber and Holbein 2022), use a combination of first name and last name (for gender) combined with location of residence (for race) to estimate posterior probabilities of a given race and/or gender.

¹²Some recent work has questioned the effectiveness of imputing race using name (Argyle and Barber 2023). To assess accuracy, we compare the estimates of race to the Legistorm-coded sample. We achieve 91.4% accuracy using the `wru` package. Alternatively, we can also estimate the trends using just the individuals for whom race was specifically identified by Legistorm coders. Using that data only, we find similar trends (see Figure A1 and Figure A2 in the online appendix).



(a) Proportion of Female Lobbyists




(b) Proportion of White Lobbyists

Figure 1: Diversity Trends Over Time

drawn at random among the 1,000 that spend the most on federal lobbying. Additionally, they are asked to rate the ideology of their current client. The groups’ latent ideologies are then estimated from these ratings using Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey scaling. This provides expert perceptions of the ideology of approximately 1,400 interest groups, where 800 are among the top 1,000 lobbying spenders. While we test the sensitivity of our results to using CFScores (Bonica 2013, 2014) and IGScores (Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz 2020) as alternative measures of interest group ideology, there are a few benefits to using our perception scales. First, when investigating diversity among lobbyists, it is important to know which groups make it into the sample and why. Since there are strategic reasons why organizations donate or choose to take a public stance on a topic, there might be selection issues complicating the inferences we can make from the sample where CFScores and IGScores are available. On the other hand, the survey-based scores target the 1,000 groups that spend the most, implying that the sampling frame is well-understood. Second, since organizations that spend more on lobbying tend to be active across a wider range of issues and have more influence on the policymaking process (Baumgartner et al. 2009), diversity among this subset is particularly crucial to understand. Whereas the alternative scales only have approximately 35% coverage among the 1,000 interest groups that spend the most on lobbying, the survey-based ratings cover approximately 80% of these groups.

Figure 2 displays the breakdown of lobbyists by gender and lobbying organization ideology

Figure 2: Lobbyist Diversity by Gender




Note: This figure plots yearly average proportions of women lobbyists within lobbying organizations split by ideology.

separating out groups to the left and to the right of the mean. The proportions are calculated as average proportion within lobbying organization of women lobbyists. In both right- and left-leaning organizations, the average proportion of women lobbyists is trending up since the beginning of sample. However, left-leaning organizations have consistently employed more women lobbyists and by 2020 there is nearly a 50/50 gender split in these organizations.

Figure 3 similarly displays trends in lobbying diversity by race over time. Two things are evident from this figure: first, lobbying is a profession consisting of mostly white individuals, with less than 10% of lobbyists as non-white. Second, there are on average decreases (increases) in the proportion of white (non-white) lobbyists over time, with a relatively consistent divide between left- and right-leaning organizations.¹³

¹³The presence of female lobbyists among conservative groups remains relatively consistent until about 2014 when it rises sharply. In contrast, there appears to be a relatively consistent

Figure 3: Lobbyist Diversity by Race



Note: This figure plots yearly average proportions of white lobbyists within lobbying organizations split by ideology.

In addition, in the online appendix, we also breakdown the diversity of lobbying groups by the industry they support in their advocacy (see Figures A3 – A6). Consistent with previous work, we find that women and minorities are also much more likely to be represented in fields more likely to be focused on minority and women’s issues (Wolman and Thomas 1970). Specifically, female lobbyists make up a greater percentage of lobbyists in the health sector (and specifically those lobbying for interests related to nursing and psychiatric health) and single-issue groups focused on abortion, women’s issues and children’s rights. Similarly, non-white lobbyists are most likely to be found lobbying on behalf of labor and single-issue ideological groups. In short, the representation of minorities and women as lobbyists in the policy process is increased in part because of their heightened participation on issues directly

growth in the proportion of lobbyists who are female in left-leaning organizations over the time period.

relating to women and minorities and is lower in other policy areas.

Discrimination in the Hiring Process?

Having documented the underrepresentation of minorities and women among lobbyists, we turn to investigating how the preferences of organized interests for particular lobbyists might affect diversity. Discrimination in the hiring process might further impede inroads that minorities and women have made among the lobbying community. Alternatively, one potential explanation for the rise in diversity among lobbyists is that organizations actively prefer such individuals. While minorities and women are underrepresented in the professional careers that are likely to lead to jobs in lobbying (Bishu and Headley 2020; Center for American Women and Politics 2022; Potter and Volden 2018; Ritchie and You 2021; Schaeffer 2021), it could be that those who are in positions to hire lobbyists are more likely to prefer those individuals.

To investigate the preferences for women and minority lobbyists in the hiring process, we use a conjoint experiment completed by political elites with intimate knowledge of the hiring process for lobbyists. By using a conjoint experiment, we avoid issues posed by data and measurement limitations, such as not being able to observe the race and gender characteristics of the population of people who endeavor to enter lobbying, and instead utilize treatments tailored to measure our characteristics of interest. Further the natural correlation of some lobbyist characteristics, such as their procedural and substantive expertise with gender or race, could make it difficult to determine the importance of those particular characteristics, the conjoint design allows us to isolate the independent effects of our characteristics of interest. Additionally, our conjoint design minimizes social desirability bias by presenting respondents with a multidimensional choice context in which they can rationalize social undesirable choices using the other characteristics' of applicants profiles (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022). This feature of the conjoint design is

particularly important for our substantive interest in discrimination, as it allows respondents to conceal choices which discriminate on the basis of race or gender by ostensibly evaluating applicants on other aspects of their resumes.

To implement the conjoint experiment, we identified all individuals listed as points of contact or lobbyists on organized interests' Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) reports filed between the first quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of 2020.¹⁴ Of the 11,341 individuals we identified, 888 participated in our experiment for an overall response rate of 7.8%, a rate similar to other survey experiments of American political elites (see Hassell, Holbein, and Miles 2020; Miller 2021). In the online appendix, we provide additional information about the characteristics of the sample (see Tables A3 and A4).

Lobbyists are an ideal sample for testing this question because they have a detailed knowledge of the job and are actively engaged in the hiring process for lobbyists (e.g., Drutman 2015; Kersh 2002). Indeed, a strong majority of our respondents reported that they actively participate in hiring decisions in situations where their employer seeks new lobbyists. In our sample, 508 respondents (57.2%) indicated that they are “always” involved in the process, while another 244 (27.5%) indicated that they are “sometimes” or “often” involved. In short, our respondents have the requisite knowledge and experience with the hiring process to shed light on interests' preferences over lobbyists' characteristics.

After answering pre-treatment questions, respondents were asked to complete two conjoint tasks sequentially. In brief explanatory prompts offered before each of these tasks, respondents were randomly assigned to imagine that they are completing the tasks during a period of unified Democratic or Republican control of Congress and the White House. In each task, respondents were first asked to imagine working for an organization looking to hire a new

¹⁴Our research was approved by the IRB at [Redacted], and each respondent voluntarily provided informed consent at the beginning of the survey. More details about this study's adherence to APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research is available in the online appendix.

lobbyist and that they have been asked to assist in the hiring process. These vignettes included three pieces of randomized information about the organization seeking to hire a lobbyist (its structure as a lobbying firm or a national association, the policy area on which it focuses, and its ideological inclination) and a summary of the resume of the applicants that included eight additional pieces of information. While many of these items pertained to applicants' skills and experience in lobbying and policymaking, such as whether they had previous lobbying experience in the issue area for which the organization is hiring, two of the items explicitly stated the applicants' gender (male or female) and race (Asian, Black, Hispanic/Latino, or White).^{15,16} While resumes typically do not explicitly state this information, extant work indicates that individuals often use names, which are provided in job applications, to make inferences about personal characteristics such as race and gender (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Broockman 2013; Einstein and Glick 2017).¹⁷ Respondents

¹⁵A potential concern could be that some respondents want to give the impression that a given characteristic is more important for hiring decisions than it actually is. However, recent methodological research suggests that such demand effects generally do not plague survey experiments because it would require respondents to correctly infer the experimenter's intent (Mummolo and Peterson 2019). In that regard, it is important to note that the conjoint design helps us to mask the intent with our experiment by providing many attributes to justify hiring decisions (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

¹⁶See Table A1 for a full description of the attribute-levels included in the resume summaries.

¹⁷An alternative design would have provided applicant names meant to signal race and gender and used those names to code those characteristics in the analysis stage. However, recent work indicates that individuals often use names to infer other characteristics that can be correlated with gender and race, such as socioeconomic status, that would make it difficult for us to attribute treatment effects to gender or race in isolation (Crabtree et al. 2022; Landgrave and Weller 2022). Therefore, by providing applicant race and gender explicitly, we avoid the potential for names to constitute bundled treatments and can directly attribute

evaluated three applicants and were asked to choose one for an interview.¹⁸ In the online appendix, we also restrict the analysis to individuals evaluating hiring decisions for firms that align with their own ideology because we might be concerned that individuals might be making assumptions about out-group preferences. However, those results mirror what we present here.¹⁹

Our potential limitation of our experimental design is that, while interest in interviewing candidates is regularly used as a measure of employment discrimination (e.g. Quillian et al. 2017), it captures potential hiring discrimination at the interview stage, but cannot observe potential discrimination that manifests independently at later stages of the hiring process, such as the job offer and negotiation stages (although we do note that in this exercise, respondents were also only allowed to select one candidate to interview rather than selecting a cohort of potential candidates to interview). Regardless, assessing discrimination at the interview stage is substantively important because it is the first step of the winnowing process by which hiring officials limit their choice set of potential employees and because discrimination at the interview stage is typically related to discrimination at later stages (Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort 1996; Neumark 2018; Quillian, Lee, and Oliver 2020; Riach and Rich 2002).²⁰ Thus, while our design cannot track potential discrimination through

effects to the levels of our race and gender attributes.

¹⁸While conjoint experiments often include only two profiles per task, we utilize three profiles per task to increase our number of observations. Jenke et al. (2021) show that unbiased average marginal component effects can be estimated when tasks include more than two profiles.

¹⁹See Table A8.

²⁰The relative effect of discrimination at different stages of the hiring process can vary across contexts; for instance, while Neumark (2018) notes that some studies conducted by the International Labor Organization demonstrated that around 90% of the total effect of ethnic discrimination occurred at the interview stage as compared to the job offer stage, a

the entirety of the hiring process, we can observe the extent to which hiring officials in the lobbyist are open to consider hiring applicants with different racial and gender characteristics.

We use respondents' forced choices to estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which indicate "the marginal effect of [a given attribute] averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 10). Substantively, each of our AMCEs represent the effect a particular applicant attribute-level on the probability a respondent will choose to interview that applicant relative to a randomly selected profile with the baseline level of that attribute. We estimate AMCEs using linear regression as implemented by the `cregg` package in R (Leeper 2020), with our forced choice outcome regressed on a series of indicator variables representing each of our non-baseline attribute-levels and standard errors clustered at the respondent level.²¹

Overall Racial and Gender Bias in the Hiring Process

We begin by examining the effect of gender on the overall likelihood that one of our respondents would choose a particular applicant as the applicant they would most like to interview.²² As

meta-analysis by Quillian, Lee, and Oliver (2020) suggests that racial discrimination manifests more strongly at the job offer stage than at the interview stage. However, even Quillian, Lee, and Oliver note that "close to half of the total discrimination in hiring occurs from initial application to callback" and that discrimination at each stage tends to move together (2020, 753).

²¹In our pre-analysis plan we pre-registered hypotheses that include 27 comparisons between specific attribute-levels and their baselines as well as between specific pairs of attribute-levels. As a result, in this analysis, we correct the α level used to evaluate our hypothesis tests and construct our confidence intervals to $\frac{0.05}{27} \approx 0.002$ even though we do not analyze all 27 comparisons in this work.

²²An alternative analysis would be to look at the effect that race and gender attributes have on the ordinal ratings that respondents gave to each applicant. In the Online Appendix

shown in Figure 4, women were actually six percentage points more likely to be chosen to be interviewed than men. Rather than being discriminated against in the interview process, we find that female applicants are viewed more positively by individuals who would be involved in the hiring process for new lobbyists. Changing the gender of the applicant from male to female increases the likelihood of being selected for an interview by six percentage points.


We also find similar effects for minority applicants. As shown in Figure 4, Hispanic/Latino candidates were seven percentage points more likely to be chosen to be interviewed than white candidates. Likewise, respondents were eight percentage points more likely to choose to interview a Black applicant for the lobbying position compared to a white applicant. We do not, however, find any positive effect for Asian applicants.

These effects, however, are not large. In addition to applicants' gender and race, we also include in Figure 4 one of the other attributes included in our experiment that described applicants' skills and expertise—applicants' Policy Experience, which specifies whether the applicant has experience lobbying in the substantive policy area for which the respondent's organization is hiring. The AMCE for Policy Match indicates that respondents were 32 percentage points more likely to choose to interview an applicant whose substantive expertise matches the policy area the organization is hiring for relative to another randomly generated applicant whose substantive expertise is not in that area of interest. That this AMCE is five to six times larger than those for female, Black, and Hispanic/Latino helps contextualize that while respondents were more likely to select applicants from underrepresented gender and racial backgrounds, the positive effects of race and gender are vastly overshadowed by other characteristics related to the applicants' skills-based qualifications.

However, at the same time, while other employment decisions are often plagued by discrimination against minorities and women, our results suggest that this is not the case in the lobbying world. Instead, our results suggest that minorities and women are actually

in Table A6 we run those alternative analyses, however, the results we present here are similar to those produced by the ordinal rating outcomes.

Figure 4: Interest in Potential Lobbyist Candidates by Race and Gender



Note: Effects of race and gender characteristics on the likelihood of being chosen to interview for lobbyist position **Takeaway:** Women and minorities are slightly more likely to be identified as a candidate to be interviewed for a position in lobbying.

avored in the hiring process. In our conjoint experiment, female and minority applicants are significantly more likely to be chosen to interview for a lobbying position than are their white and male counterparts, though these positive effects are small relative to the effects associated with the skills and expertise valued among lobbyists, such as experience lobbying in the substantive policy area of interest. These results may help explain why the percentage of minorities and women in lobbyist positions have increased in recent decades despite continuing

to be a smaller percentage of potential applicants.


Heterogeneity in the Hiring Process

Overall results, however, may mask important differences across ideologies and parties. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that liberals and conservatives are different in how much they value descriptive representation (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Hassell and Visalvanich 2019). As such, we specifically separate out liberal and conservative respondents to identify how preferences for minority and female candidates varies by ideology.²³ This analysis is shown in Figure 5.

Similarly, we find a 10 (7) percentage point increase in the likelihood of selecting an applicant for an interview if that applicant is Black (Hispanic) relative to white applicants among liberals, differences that are all statistically significant. In contrast, we find smaller (and insignificant) effects for applicant race among conservative respondents. Similarly, in analyzing gender, we find that while conservative respondents were four percentage points more likely to select a female applicant for an interview, that effect is not statistically significant. However, liberal respondents are six percentage points more likely to select the female applicant, a difference that is statistically significant. In short, the inclination to hire minority and female candidates to lobbying positions appears to be driven by the preferences of liberal respondents. While conservative respondents do not discriminate against women and minorities, they do not express significantly more interest in interviewing them relative

²³Alternatively, an alternative approach would be to subset the sample into individuals working for liberal or conservative groups. Because most respondents identify the group for which they work as moderate, however, this substantially reduces the number of observations. Despite this, however, this alternative analysis shows similar results.

Figure 5: Interest in Potential Lobbyist Candidates by Race and Gender Conditional on Respondent Ideology



Note: Effects of race and gender characteristics on the likelihood of being chosen to interview for lobbyist position by the ideology of the respondent **Takeaway:** Women and minorities are slightly more likely to be interviewed for a position in lobbying, and these effects are stronger among liberal than among conservative respondents.

to White and male applicants.^{24,25}

²⁴While the treatment effects are statistically distinguishable from zero among liberals but not conservatives, we note that the differences in the treatment effects between liberals and conservatives are not themselves distinguishable. Thus, we find that liberals prefer to interview

Conclusion

As we noted at the beginning of this work, racial and gender diversity have a significant and substantive effect on the policy making process. The inclusion of women and minorities in that process fundamentally changes the issues and approaches to policy and improves the representation of individuals from those groups (Grose 2011; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014; Swers 2002). In this paper, we have examined one previously under scrutinized component of that policy making process, namely, the gender and racial diversity of lobbyists working on Capitol Hill.

We find that while the representation of women and minorities among those involved in lobbyist activity has substantially increased over time, these individuals are still underrepresented in the lobbying community. While female lobbyists made up 37 percent of individuals working in lobbying in 2001, that number had increased to 42 percent by 2020. Similarly, while whites made up almost 96 percent of all lobbyists in 2004, that number had declined slightly to 92 percent by 2020.

The underrepresentation of minorities and women, however, is greater among groups from the conservative side of the ideological spectrum than it is among those that are more women and minorities and no evidence that conservatives express similar preferences, but we do not find evidence that the preferences of liberals are different from those of conservatives.

²⁵As a robustness check, we repeat this analysis among only those respondents assigned to imagine working for hypothetical organization whose ideology matches their own (see Table A8). The point estimates in this model are similar to those depicted in Figure 5, though because of the steep reduction in sample size renders some of the estimates no longer statistically significant. These results make us cautiously optimistic that our results are not driven by respondents assigned to organizations whose ideology differ from their own and project what they assume are the preferences of ideologically dissonant groups on applicants' gender and racial characteristics when making their choices.

liberal in their ideological leanings. On the whole, women and minorities made up a greater proportion of lobbyists among groups that were more left leaning.

In addition, the results from our conjoint experiment provide some evidence that a portion of these declines could be attributed to affirmative decisions among those in positions to hire lobbyists to prioritize the hiring of minorities and women to those positions. In our experiment, we find that minority and female applicants are more likely to be selected for an interview relative to their white and male counterparts. On the whole, individuals in positions to hire lobbyists appear to be more inclined to hire those from underrepresented groups.

These effects, however, appear to be concentrated among liberals relative to conservatives in ways that appear to align with patterns in actual staffing behaviors. We find that while the preference for minorities and women is significant among liberal respondents, it smaller and insignificant among conservatives.

While our findings shed some light into the demand that interest groups have for hiring women and minorities as lobbyists, there is still more work to be done to understand the reasons why there is a greater demand to interview minorities and women for lobbying positions. On the one hand, greater demand for women and minorities could be because of a recognition of the need for such individuals. Alternatively, greater demand for women and minorities could also be the result of perceptions among respondents that women who are similarly qualified as men are higher quality candidates given the more difficult pathway they face to gain those qualifications (see for example, Fulton 2010). Although our work shows slightly higher demand for women and minorities as lobbyists, future work would be well to identify the motivations for those demands.

Overall, however, our evidence suggests that women and minorities are favored in the lobbyist hiring process and indicate that while there has been progress made through increasing the representation of diverse voices in lobbying in recent years, there are still significant steps to be made.

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**Online Appendix for “Lobbying Against Discrimination:
Evidence of Racial and Gender Discrimination in
Lobbyist Hiring Decisions”**
(Not intended for print publication)

Contents

A	Conjoint Experiment Additional Information	1
B	Sampling Procedure and Descriptive Statistics	12
C	Empirical Results	20
D	Race and Gender Estimation	28

A Conjoint Experiment Additional Information

Adherence to APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research

This research fully conforms with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. In particular, respondents gave their voluntary informed consent to participate in the research in accordance with IRB guidance and with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. In the study, respondents were provided with the following information about the project:

- researcher name and affiliation and contact information
- the general purpose of the research
- an explanation of what participation entails
- potential risks to participants
- clarification that no potential benefits to participants were expected
- assurances that responses were confidential and additional information about how identities and data will be protected and
- sources of financial support for the research (there was none).

In the study respondents participated voluntarily and were not compensated for participation. No deception was used. In all cases, IRB review identified the research as having minimal risk of harm.

Protocol

After providing consent and completing pre-treatment questions, respondents were provided with the following preface to the two conjoint tasks:

The following two hypothetical scenarios will ask you to assume the role of a lobbyist working for a client or firm and to help organization hire a new lobbyist to join your team.

For the purposes of these scenarios, assume that you are working in a context of unified government where [Democrats/Republicans] control the House, Senate, and the White House.

Note that in this preface, respondents were randomly assigned to imagine that either Democrats or Republicans had unified control of the federal government and that this randomization was fixed across both of respondents' tasks. We included this randomization to encourage respondents to abstract away from the real-world political context that existed at the time and idiosyncratic features that might inform their decisionmaking in an actual hiring process, and instead to draw on their general evaluations of the job candidates we presented to them.²⁶

²⁶Our survey was fielded between December 1, 2020 and January 3, 2021. During this period lame duck period of the 116th Congress, Democrats held the House of Representatives while Republicans held the White House and the Senate. Prior to the outcome of the Senate elections in Georgia held on January 3, 2021 and not called until after response collection ceased, it was unknown whether the 117th Congress would see a unified Democratic government or a divided government where Democrats controlled the House and the White House but Republicans controlled the Senate. Our abstraction was intended to draw respondents away from thinking about this particular moment in American politics and how it might influence their hiring decisions and instead consider how they utilize information about job candidates to make hiring decisions in a general sense. For instance, our abstraction precludes the possibility that a respondent might have an expectation about which member of Congress was likely to hold a committee chair relevant for the issues area we identified in our experiments in the upcoming 117th Congress and thus chose a specific job candidate profile because they

Conjoint Vignette and Randomization Details

Each conjoint task presented respondents with the following text, followed by three applicant profiles with randomly assigned levels for each attribute:

Imagine that you work as a lobbyist for a [**lobbying firm/national association**] that focuses on [**real estate/tax**] policy. Your organization is generally considered to be [**liberal/conservative/bipartisan**].

Your organization is hiring a new lobbyist to join your team, and you have been asked to participate in the hiring process. Your organization wants the new hire to help analyze new legislation and regulations affecting [**real estate/tax**] policy and lobby members of Congress on its behalf.

You are currently screening applicant resumes to decide which applicants you would like to personally interview for the position. Below are the summaries of 3 resumes you are considering.

Note that in addition to the profile attribute-levels, this text randomizes three other facets.

- First, the substantive policy focus of the organization featured in each task was randomly assigned to be either real estate or tax policy. In order to encourage respondents to consider each task independently and to account for potential task-ordering effects, each respondent completed one task with each substantive policy focus and the order in which policy focuses were presented was randomized for each respondent.
- Second, the structure of organization featured in each task was randomly assigned to be either a national association or a lobbying firm. This randomization occurred at the task-level, such that respondents could have completed two tasks in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by a national association or by a lobbying firm,

thought that type of candidate would be best able to lobby that member of Congress.

or one task in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by an association and another in which they were asked to imagine themselves employed by a firm.

- Third, the organization’s ideological leanings expressed in each task was randomly assigned to be liberal, conservative or bipartisan. Like the structure of the organization, this randomization occurred at the task-level.

Each applicant profile was populated with the attribute-levels provided in Table A1. To mitigate potential attribute-ordering effects, we randomized the order in which attributes appeared for each task (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). For analysis, we recoded the attribute-levels as shown in Table A2. In order for the non-restricted attribute-levels in Table A2 to appear with equal probability and for the restricted attribute-levels to appear with equal probability within their applicable strata, the attribute-levels in provided in Table A1 appeared in profiles with the following probabilities:

- The unique levels of the applicant’s gender, race/ethnicity, and community involvement appeared in the profiles with equal probability.
- For the languages spoken attribute, applicants were assigned “English” with a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ and one of the three bilingual options with a probability of $\frac{1}{6}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage, half of the applicants are identified as monolingual and half are identified as bilingual.
- For previous lobbying employment, applicants were assigned “None” with a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$ and “Less than 5 years in [real estate/tax] policy”, “5-10 years in [real estate/-tax] policy”, “More than 10 years in [real estate/tax] policy”, “Less than 5 years in [defense/education] policy”, “5-10 years in [defense/education] policy”, and “More than 10 years in [defense/education] policy” with a probability of $\frac{1}{9}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage for policy expertise, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicant have no lobbying experience, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have experience in the organization’s substantive field of expertise, and $\frac{1}{3}$ of

applicants have experience in a substantive field other than that of the organization's expertise. Further, at the analysis stage for length of time of lobbying experience, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have no experience, $\frac{2}{9}$ have less than 5 years of experience, $\frac{2}{9}$ have 5-10 years of experience, and $\frac{2}{9}$ have more than 10 years of experience.

- For the previous political employment attribute, applicants were assigned “None” with a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$, “Director of Domestic Policy for a Liberal Think Tank” or “Director of Domestic Policy for a Conservative Think Tank” with a probability of $\frac{1}{6}$ each, and “Legislative Director for a Democratic House Member,” “Communications Director for a Democratic House Member,” “Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Democrats,” “Legislative Director for a Republican House Member,” “Communications Director for a Republican House Member,” and “Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Republicans” with a probability of $\frac{1}{18}$ each. Thus, at the analysis stage, $\frac{1}{3}$ of applicants have no previous political employment, $\frac{1}{3}$ have experience at a think tank, and $\frac{1}{3}$ have experience in one of the three congressional staff roles (with equal probability in each role), and applicants with think tank or congressional experience have an equal probability of being associated with Democrats/liberals or Republicans/conservatives.

Table A1: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels

Attribute	Levels	Restrictions?
Gender	Male (baseline)	None
	Female	None
Race/Ethnicity	White (baseline)	None
	Black	None
	Hispanic/Latino	None
	Asian	None
Languages Spoken	English (baseline)	None
	English, [Spanish, Portuguese]	None
	English, [French, German] English, [Chinese, Japanese]	None
Community Involvement	None (baseline)	None
	Volunteer at local food bank	None
	Docent at local museum	None
	Youth sports coach	None
Previous Lobbying Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Less than 5 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	5-10 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	More than 15 years in [real estate/tax] policy	None
	Less than 5 years in [defense/education] policy 5-10 years in [defense/education] policy More than 15 years in [defense/education] policy	None None None
Previous Political Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Director of Domestic Policy for a Conservative Think Tank	None
	Director of Domestic Policy for a Liberal Think Tank	None
	Legislative Director for a Republican House member	None
	Legislative Director for a Democratic House member	None
	Communications Director for a Republican House member Communications Director for a Democratic House member Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Republicans Professional Staffer for House Ways and Means Committee Democrats	None None None None None None

Table presents the attributes, attribute-levels, and attribute-level restrictions for each of the six characteristics included in the applicants' resume summaries used in the conjoint experiment tasks. In each task, respondents are presented with three profiles which consist of randomly assigned levels for each of the six attributes; unless otherwise noted in the table, attribute-level assignments are completely randomized (i.e. no restrictions conditional on assignment of other attribute-levels). The ordering of the attributes is also randomized across respondents and tasks. Where elements of attribute-levels appear in brackets, the first element in brackets can appear when the policy specialty of the hiring organization is real estate policy, and the second element in brackets can appear when the policy specialty of the hiring organization is tax policy.

Table A2: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Recorded)

Attribute	Levels	Restrictions?
Gender	Male (baseline)	None
	Female	None
Race/Ethnicity	White (baseline)	None
	Black	None
	Hispanic/Latino	None
	Asian	None
Languages Spoken	English Only (baseline)	None
	Bilingual	None
Community Involvement	None (baseline)	None
	Volunteer at local food bank	None
	Docent at local museum	None
	Youth sports coach	None
Years of Lobbying Experience	None (baseline)	None
	<5 years	None
	5-10 years	None
	>15 years	None
Policy-Relevant Lobbying Experience	No	None
	Yes	Years of Lobbying Exp. must not be “None”
Previous Political Employment	None (baseline)	None
	Think tank	None
	Congress	None
	Legislative director	None
	Communications director	None
	Committee staff	None
Ideological/Partisan Alignment of Applicant/Organization	Indeterminate	Prev. Pol. Emp. must be “None”
	Match	Prev. Pol. Emp. must not be “None”
	Mismatch	Prev. Pol. Emp. must not be “None”

Table presents the attributes, attribute-levels, and attribute-level restrictions for each of the ten characteristics extracted from the applicants’ resume summaries present in the conjoint experiment tasks. Unless otherwise noted in the table, attribute-level assignments are completely randomized (i.e. no restrictions conditional on assignment of other attribute-levels). For the original codings of attribute-levels, please see Table A1.

Pre-Treatment Questions

- What is your gender?
 - Male
 - Female
 - Other (please specify)
 - Prefer not to say

- How old are you?
 - 18-29
 - 30-49
 - 50-64
 - 65 and over

- How much school or college have you completed?
 - Some high school or less
 - High school graduate or GED
 - Some college, no 4-year degree
 - College graduate
 - Post-graduate degree

- Which best describes your household income?
 - Less than \$25,000
 - \$25,000-\$50,000
 - \$50,000-\$75,000
 - \$75,000-\$100,000
 - \$100,000-\$200,000
 - \$200,000 or more

- Which best describes your race?

- American Indian or Alaska Native
 - Asian
 - Black or African-American
 - Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
 - White
 - Other (please specify)
- Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?
 - Yes
 - No
- When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative?
 - Very liberal
 - Somewhat liberal
 - Slightly liberal
 - Moderate
 - Slightly conservative
 - Somewhat conservative
 - Very conservative
- Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?
 - Democrat (subsequent questions to distinguish between “strong” and “not so strong”)
 - Republican (subsequent questions to distinguish between “strong” and “not so strong”)
 - Independent (subsequent questions to assess whether “closer to Democratic Party,” “closer to Republican Party,” or “neither”)

- Other
- How many years have you worked in lobbying, government relations, policy advocacy, or a related field? Please do not include any time during which you worked for the federal government.
 - Less than 5 years
 - 5 to 10 years
 - 10 to 15 years
 - 15 to 20 years
 - More than 20 years
- Have you ever worked or served in the federal government in any of the following capacities? Select all that apply.
 - Member of Congress
 - Staffer of a member of Congress or congressional committee
 - Presidential appointee in a federal agency
 - Employee of the Executive Office of the President
 - Civil servant in a federal agency (outside the Executive Office of the President)
 - Other (please specify)
- Which of the following best describes your role in working for your current client(s)?
 - Lobbyist or government relations/policy advocacy professional
 - Executive officer with ultimate responsibility for lobbying/government relations/policy advocacy
 - Executive officer without ultimate responsibility for lobbying/government relations/policy advocacy
 - Other (please specify)
- When your employer hires new lobbyists or government relations/policy advocacy professionals, how often are you involved in the hiring process?

- Never
- Rarely
- Sometimes
- Often
- Always

Post-Treatment Questions

- How interested would you be in interviewing each of these applicants? (*Asked separately for each applicant*)
 - Not at all interested
 - Slightly interested
 - Somewhat interested
 - Very interested
 - Extremely interested
- If you could only interview one of these applicants, which applicant would you prefer to interview?
 - Applicant 1
 - Applicant 2
 - Applicant 3
- Are there any additional pieces of information typically provided in applicants' resumes that you use when making hiring decisions that were not included in the previous tasks? [PRESENTED ON A SEPARATE SCREEN ONCE BOTH TASKS ARE COMPLETED]
 - No
 - Yes (please describe) [TEXT BOX PROVIDED]

B Sampling Procedure and Descriptive Statistics

Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) and subsequent amendments, individuals who meet the thresholds for designation as a lobbyist must complete and submit a quarterly report, known as an LD-2 form, for each of their clients detailing their lobbying activities on behalf of the client. The sampling frame for our survey is the full universe of individuals listed as 1) lobbyists 2) or points of contact on quarterly LD-2 reports from the first quarter of 2019 through the third quarter of 2020.

- **Registered Lobbyists** Under the LDA, a lobbyist is an individual who, in working on behalf of a client, makes a “lobbying contact,” or an “oral, written, or electronic communication” regarding the conduct of public policy, with more than one “covered official,” which includes most members of the executive and legislative branches—include the president, vice-president, and members of Congress—and spends 20 percent or more of her time working for the client on lobbying activities within a quarterly period. As of January 2017, a lobbyist employed directly by a client that spends \$13,000 or more, or a lobbyist contracted by a client that spends \$3,000 or more on lobbying activities in a given quarter, is required to file an LD-2 report (or be listed as a lobbyist on their organization’s LD-2 form) for that quarter.
- **Points of contact** Each LD-2 report identifies a point of contact for the lobbyist or for the organization employing the lobbyist, or the registrant. While this point of contact can be an individual who is not a registered lobbyist under the LDA, the vast majority of points of contact are LDA lobbyists, and those individuals who are not LDA lobbyists often perform government relations or policy advocacy functions and are familiar with lobbying activity (see Miller 2021).

For each individual, his or her most recent appearance on a report was selected so as to obtain the most up-to-date contact and employment information; in cases where the same

individual appeared on more than one LD-2 report in a given quarter, one report on which that individual appeared as the point of contact was randomly sampled to be associated with that individual.

While each LD-2 report provides an email address for the designated point of contact, it does not provide email addresses for the registered lobbyists listed on that LD-2 report who are not the point of contact.²⁷ To expand the size of our sample and to include more potential respondents who are themselves registered lobbyists, we assumed that the email addresses of the lobbyists followed the same format as the email address provided for the point of contact and imputed for those lobbyists email addresses following the organization's apparent format; for instance, if the point of contact's email address was "[first name].[last name]@[organization name].com," we assumed that the lobbyists' email addresses were similar in structure and used the names provided to impute email addresses of the same pattern. After combining the email addresses imputed for lobbyists with those provided on LD-2 forms for points of contact and de-duplicating the list of individuals and email addresses, our final sampling frame consisted of 14,404 lobbyists and points of contact.

Initial survey invitations were distributed to all 14,404 unique recipients on December 1, 2021 and reminders were sent to all persons who had not yet completed the survey on December 10, December 21, and between December 27 and January 3 . The email addresses for 3,063 intended recipients were deemed invalid when initial invitations were sent, leaving a sampling frame of 11,341 lobbyists and points of contact and an overall response rate of 7.8% $\frac{888}{11341}$. This response rate compares favorably to those achieved in other survey experiments

²⁷While most email addresses provided for points of contact are unique, some lobbying firms provide generic email addresses for all reports they file (e.g., LDA@Venable.com). To minimize email bounces and improve response rates, we identified instances in which generic email addresses were used and made every effort was made to obtain a unique email address for that individual (searching the organization website, LinkedIn, other social media platforms, etc.).

of American political elites (see Miller 2021).

It is difficult to assess the representativeness of our respondents to the lobbyists and points of contact in the sampling frame because scant systematic information is available regarding them and the clients for which they work; unlike more publicly visible political actors in Washington, DC, such as members of Congress, whose personal information is collated in the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress and can be systematically coded for inclusion in research, no central repository for similar personal information, such as partisanship and career history, exist for lobbyists and policy advocates. However, four pieces of information about the lobbyists and points of contact and their clients can be gleaned from their LDA filings and the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which cleans and aggregates the LDA filings: the client's quarterly lobbying expenditures with that lobbyist or point of contact's employer (i.e. the client's own expenditures if the lobbyist or point of contact is employed directly, or the client's expenditures with a given firm if the lobbyist or point of contact is a contract employee); whether the filer is the client or a lobbying firm contracted by a client; the client's sector coding, as assigned by CRP; and whether the person, if a point of contact, is also a registered lobbyist under the LDA.²⁸ Table A3 compares the distribution of these four characteristics in both the full sampling frame and the sample of respondents who took part in the experiment. These comparisons reveal differences for two of the four characteristics (Lobbying Expenditures and CRP Category) that are substantively small but

²⁸The first three of these pieces of information are easily observable from CRP's aggregated LDA filings, but the fourth can only be determined by assessing whether points of contact listed on LD-2 forms are also listed as registered lobbyists. To determine whether each point of contact is also a registered lobbyist, I used approximate matching techniques to compare the name of the point of contact on each LDA filing to the names of all of the registered lobbyists also appearing on the filing, and visually inspected the best match for each LDA form to determine if the point of contact was also listed as a registered lobbyist.

statistically distinguishable at the $p < 0.05$ level.²⁹ Thus, while the sample of respondents differs from the sampling frame, it contains a sizable number of respondents with each unique level of these characteristics.³⁰

Finally, Table A4 provides information on the descriptive characteristics of the individuals who completed conjoint experiment tasks. This descriptive information was collected as part of the survey, and thus only provides information about respondents. The high proportions of respondents who report education levels of “post-graduate degree” (68.1%), income levels of “\$200,000 or more” (58.1%), experience levels of “more than 20 years” (41.1%), and professional roles as “lobbyists” or “executive officers responsible for lobbying” (88.6%) suggest that most survey respondents were themselves members of the population of interest—political elites who play a substantive role in lobbying and policy advocacy—rather than low-level employees who may respond to emails but lack significant lobbying experience. Further, that the majority of respondents indicated that they are “Always” involved in their organization’s hiring of new lobbyists (508 respondents, or 57.2%), and that most respondents reported being “Sometimes,” “Often,” or “Always” involved in hiring (752 respondents, or 84.7%), indicates that our respondents have the requisite knowledge and expertise to complete our conjoint hiring tasks.

²⁹The $|t|$ and χ^2 test statistics from the difference in means and χ^2 tests are: $|t| = 1.00$ for Lobbyist Employer; $\chi^2_3 = 61.33$ for Lobbying Expenditures; $\chi^2_{13} = 51.33$ for CRP Category; and $|t| = 1.96$ for Registered Lobbyist.

³⁰To account for these differences between our sample and the sampling frame, we also replicated our analyses by weighting our observations to mirror the distribution of these four characteristics in the sampling frame. These analyses (not shown) are substantively similar; the point estimates closely resemble those presented here, though the confidence intervals widen and decrease our statistical power in a few cases.

Sample Descriptive Statistics

Table A3: Comparison of Respondents with Sampling Frame

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>% of Respondents (N)</u>	<u>% of Sampling Frame (N)</u>
<u>Employer Type</u>		
Client	54.4% (483)	56.0% (6350)
Firm	45.6% (405)	44.0% (4991)
<u>Lobbying Expenditures</u>		
First Quartile	32.4% (288)	25.0% (2836)
Second Quartile	29.3% (260)	25.0% (2835)
Third Quartile	22.1% (196)	25.0% (2835)
Fourth Quartile	16.2% (144)	25.0% (2835)
<u>CRP Category</u>		
Agribusiness	5.1% (45)	4.1% (468)
Communications and Electronics	6.5% (58)	7.5% (853)
Construction	1.0% (9)	2.0% (231)
Defense	0.9% (8)	1.8% (199)
Energy and Natural Resources	6.0% (53)	7.1% (807)
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	7.2% (64)	10.6% (1198)
Health	19.4% (172)	19.6% (2218)
Ideological and Single-Issue	12.6% (112)	10.0% (1132)
Labor	2.6% (23)	2.2% (247)
Lawyers and Lobbyists	1.4% (12)	0.6% (69)
Misc Business	11.5% (102)	12.7% (1445)
Other	6.9% (61)	5.7% (642)
Transportation	7.4% (66)	7.1% (807)
Unknown	11.6% (103)	9.0% (1025)
<u>Registered Lobbyist</u>		
Yes	77.9% (692)	75.3% (8540)
No	22.1% (196)	24.7% (2801)

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>% of Respondents (N)</u>
<u>Gender</u>	
Female	32.4% (288)
Male	67.5% (599)
NA	0.1% (1)
<u>Age</u>	
18-29	7.2% (64)
30-49	39.2% (348)
50-64	38.0% (337)
65 or over	15.3% (136)
NA	0.3% (3)
<u>Education</u>	
Some college, no 4-year degree	1.5% (13)
College graduate	35.0% (311)
Post-graduate degree	63.4% (563)
NA	0.1% (1)
<u>Race</u>	
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.2% (2)
Asian	1.6% (14)
Black or African-American	3.0% (27)
White	91.6% (813)
Other	3.0% (27)
NA	0.6% (5)
<u>Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?</u>	
Yes	3.6% (32)
No	95.4% (847)
NA	1.0% (9)
<u>Income</u>	
Less than \$25,000	0.1% (1)
\$25,000-\$49,999	0.3% (3)
\$50,000-\$74,999	4.5% (40)
\$75,000-\$99,999	4.4% (39)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>% of Respondents (N)</u>
\$100,000-\$199,999	21.1% (187)
\$200,000 or more	67.2% (597)
NA	2.4% (21)
<u>Ideology</u>	
Very liberal	14.0% (124)
Somewhat liberal	26.7% (237)
Slightly liberal	14.9% (132)
Neither liberal nor conservative	12.5% (111)
Slightly conservative	10.9% (97)
Somewhat conservative	15.2% (135)
Very conservative	5.3% (47)
NA	0.6% (5)
<u>Party Identification</u>	
Strong Democrat	44.6% (396)
Not a very strong Democrat	9.8% (87)
Lean Democrat	7.0% (62)
Independent	6.9% (61)
Lean Republican	4.8% (43)
Not a very strong Republican	9.7% (86)
Strong Republican	14.5% (129)
Other	2.4% (21)
NA	0.3% (3)
<u>Lobbying Experience</u>	
Less than 5 years	11.6% (103)
5-10 years	18.8% (167)
11-15 years	17.3% (154)
16-20 years	14.6% (130)
More than 20 years	37.5% (333)
NA	0.1% (1)
<u>Past Government Experience</u>	
Member of Congress	4.8% (43)
Congressional staffer	47.3% (420)
Presidential appointee	8.7% (77)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>% of Respondents (N)</u>
EOP staffer	4.2% (37)
Civil servant	12.3% (109)
Other	10.8% (96)
No experience	31.9% (283)
<u>Current Role with Client</u>	
Lobbyist	68.5% (608)
Executive officer responsible for lobbying	23.1% (205)
Executive officer not responsible for lobbying	3.3% (29)
Other	4.4% (39)
NA	0.8% (7)
<u>Frequency of Involvement in Hiring Lobbyists</u>	
Never	6.9% (61)
Rarely	5.6% (50)
Sometimes	13.2% (117)
Often	14.3% (127)
Always	57.2% (508)
NA	2.8% (25)

C Empirical Results

Table A5: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, All Profiles)

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender		
Male (baseline)	-	-
Female	0.06* (0.01)	[0.02, 0.09]
Race		
White (baseline)	-	-
Black	0.08* (0.02)	[0.03, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.07* (0.02)	[0.02, 0.12]
Asian	0.01 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.06]
Bilingual		
No (baseline)	-	-
Yes	-0.00 (0.01)	[-0.04, 0.03]
Community Involvement		
None (baseline)	-	-
Museum docent	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.03, 0.07]
Youth sports coach	0.03 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.08]
Food bank volunteer	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.01, 0.09]
Years of Lobbying Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
< 5 years	-0.05 (0.02)	[-0.11, 0.01]
5-10 years	0.06 (0.02)	[-0.00, 0.11]
> 10 years	0.09* (0.02)	[0.04, 0.15]
Policy Alignment		
No policy match (baseline)	-	-
Policy match	0.32* (0.01)	[0.27, 0.36]
Ideological Alignment		
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-
Aligned	0.01 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.06]
Misaligned	-0.05* (0.02)	[-0.10, -0.00]

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Political Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.11* (0.02)	[0.06, 0.16]
Comms. Director	0.15* (0.02)	[0.08, 0.22]
Leg. Director	0.24* (0.02)	[0.17, 0.31]
Committee Staff	0.42* (0.02)	[0.35, 0.49]

Number of observations=5223 (888 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) presented in Figures 1 and 2 which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as an interview candidate. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis significance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). * $p < 0.0018$.

Table A6: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Ordinal Rating, All Profiles)

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender		
Male (baseline)	-	-
Female	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.02, 0.17]
Race		
White (baseline)	-	-
Black	0.11 (0.04)	[-0.02, 0.25]
Hispanic	0.15* (0.05)	[0.01, 0.29]
Asian	0.00 (0.04)	[-0.13, 0.14]
Bilingual		
No (baseline)	-	-
Yes	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.09, 0.10]
Community Involvement		
None (baseline)	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.17]
Youth sports coach	0.10 (0.04)	[-0.03, 0.24]
Food bank volunteer	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.05, 0.23]
Years of Lobbying Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
< 5 years	-0.01 (0.06)	[-0.17, 0.15]
5-10 years	0.38* (0.06)	[0.22, 0.55]
> 10 years	0.41* (0.06)	[0.24, 0.58]
Policy Alignment		
No policy match (baseline)	-	-
Policy match	0.97* (0.04)	[0.84, 1.09]
Ideological Alignment		
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-
Aligned	0.12 (0.06)	[-0.04, 0.28]
Misaligned	-0.22* (0.05)	[-0.38, -0.06]
Political Experience		
None (baseline)	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.61* (0.06)	[0.45, 0.78]

Attribute/Level	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Comms. Director	0.65* (0.07)	[0.45, 0.86]
Leg. Director	0.97* (0.07)	[0.76, 1.17]
Committee Staff	1.40* (0.07)	[1.20, 1.60]

Number of observations=5348 (902 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) indicating the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on respondents' five-point ordinal ratings of interview candidates. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis significance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). * $p < 0.0018$.

Table A7: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Respondent Ideology)

Attribute/Level	Liberals		Conservatives	
	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender				
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Female	0.06* (0.02)	[0.01, 0.11]	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.09]
Race				
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Black	0.10* (0.02)	[0.03, 0.17]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.07* (0.02)	[0.00, 0.14]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.08, 0.10]
Asian	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.09]	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.15]
Bilingual				
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.01 (0.01)	[-0.04, 0.05]	-0.01 (0.02)	[-0.07, 0.06]
Community Involvement				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.03 (0.02)	[-0.04, 0.10]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.03, 0.14]
Youth sports coach	0.04 (0.02)	[-0.03, 0.10]	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.07, 0.12]
Food bank volunteer	0.05 (0.02)	[-0.02, 0.11]	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.14]
Years of Lobbying Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
< 5 years	-0.04 (0.03)	[-0.12, 0.04]	-0.05 (0.03)	[-0.15, 0.05]
5-10 years	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.01, 0.15]	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.06, 0.15]
> 10 years	0.09* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.17]	0.12* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.22]
Policy Alignment				
No policy match (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Policy match	0.33* (0.02)	[0.27, 0.38]	0.29* (0.03)	[0.22, 0.37]
Ideological Alignment				
Indeterminate (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Aligned	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.08]	0.03 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.12]
Misaligned	-0.06 (0.02)	[-0.12, 0.00]	-0.05 (0.03)	[-0.13, 0.03]
Political Experience				

Attribute/Level	<u>Liberals</u>		<u>Conservatives</u>	
	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.13* (0.02)	[0.07, 0.19]	0.10* (0.03)	[0.02, 0.19]
Comms. Director	0.18* (0.03)	[0.09, 0.27]	0.17* (0.04)	[0.05, 0.29]
Leg. Director	0.28* (0.03)	[0.19, 0.37]	0.25* (0.04)	[0.13, 0.38]
Committee Staff	0.45* (0.03)	[0.36, 0.55]	0.43* (0.04)	[0.31, 0.55]

Number of observations=4548 (772 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as an interview candidate conditioned by the respondent's self-reported ideology on a seven-point scale (those answering "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," or "slightly liberal" are recoded here as "Liberal," and those answering "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," or "slightly conservative" are recoded here as "Conservative"). AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis significance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). * $p < 0.0018$.

Table A8: Conjoint Experiment Attributes and Levels (Binary Choice, Conditioned by Respondent Ideology, Only Among Ideologically Compatible Respondents)

Attribute/Level	Liberals		Conservatives	
	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Gender				
Male (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Female	0.08 (0.03)	[-0.00, 0.16]	0.07 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.17]
Race				
White (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Black	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.03, 0.20]	-0.03 (0.05)	[-0.20, 0.13]
Hispanic	0.09 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.21]	-0.03 (0.06)	[-0.21, 0.14]
Asian	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.15]	-0.06 (0.05)	[-0.22, 0.11]
Bilingual				
No (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Yes	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.10]	-0.04 (0.04)	[-0.16, 0.08]
Community Involvement				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Museum docent	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.07, 0.15]	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.23]
Youth sports coach	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.09, 0.14]	0.05 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.19]
Food bank volunteer	0.05 (0.04)	[-0.06, 0.17]	0.11 (0.05)	[-0.04, 0.25]
Years of Lobbying Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
< 5 years	-0.03 (0.05)	[-0.17, 0.11]	-0.12 (0.07)	[-0.31, 0.06]
5-10 years	0.07 (0.05)	[-0.07, 0.20]	-0.05 (0.07)	[-0.24, 0.14]
> 10 years	0.08 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.20]	0.09 (0.06)	[-0.08, 0.25]
Policy Alignment				
No policy match (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Policy match	0.33* (0.03)	[0.24, 0.42]	0.30* (0.04)	[0.17, 0.42]
Political Experience				
None (baseline)	-	-	-	-
Think Tank Director	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.15]	0.00 (0.05)	[-0.14, 0.14]
Comms. Director	0.14 (0.05)	[-0.01, 0.30]	0.05 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.25]
Leg. Director	0.21* (0.04)	[0.17, 0.34]	0.19 (0.08)	[-0.05, 0.43]

Attribute/Level	<u>Liberals</u>		<u>Conservatives</u>	
	Estimate (SE)	95% CI	Estimate (SE)	95% CI
Committee Staff	0.43* (0.05)	[0.29, 0.57]	0.45* (0.07)	[0.23, 0.67]

Number of observations=1536 (424 unique respondents). This table presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) which indicate the effect of each of the applicant attribute-levels included in the conjoint experiment tasks on the probability of selection as an interview candidate conditioned by the respondent's self-reported ideology on a seven-point scale (those answering "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," or "slightly liberal" are recoded here as "Liberal," and those answering "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," or "slightly conservative" are recoded here as "Conservative"). This analysis subsets to only respondent-tasks in which the respondent was assigned to imagine working for an organization whose ideology matches their own (e.g., a "somewhat liberal" respondent assigned to a "liberal" organization). Due to this subsetting, which restricts us to organizations assigned to be either liberal or conservative, we induce collinearity between our Ideological Alignment and Political Experience attributes (since all applicants with political experience are either Aligned or Misaligned with the organization's ideology); due to this, we omit our Ideological Alignment attribute from this analysis. AMCEs are estimated using linear regression (accounting for design restrictions). To account for multiple comparisons (27 comparisons collectively associated with our pre-registered hypotheses), a Bonferroni correction is implemented to conduct null hypothesis significance tests and to construct 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{27} = 0.0018$). Null hypothesis significance tests and Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals utilize cluster robust standard errors (clustered on respondent). * $p < 0.0018$.

D Race and Gender Estimation

For the descriptive figures in the manuscript, we impute the race of the lobbyist for individuals without a race designated by Legistorm. We can use the Legistorm-coded race of lobbyists ($n = 21,068$ unique lobbyists) to determine the accuracy of the estimation done through the `wru` (Khanna, Imai, and Khanna 2019) package. In general the estimation procedure is quite accurate, achieving 91.4% correct estimates. Table A9 displays the results of a more detailed examination through comparing the Legistorm-coded race to the estimated race for the same individuals. The N column shows the number of individuals that were estimated, for example, as Hispanic when their true (Legistorm) race is White. The `wru` software performs quite well across races with the major exception in estimating Black lobbyists as races other than Black, especially White.

Table A9: Race Estimation

Legistorm Race	Estimated Race	N
Asian	Asian	453
Asian	Black	4
Asian	Hispanic	6
Asian	White	167
Black	Asian	9
Black	Black	186
Black	Hispanic	10
Black	Other	2
Black	White	869
Hispanic	Asian	9
Hispanic	Black	2
Hispanic	Hispanic	395
Hispanic	White	131
White	Asian	112
White	Black	243
White	Hispanic	234
White	Other	9
White	White	18227

We include two figures (Figures A1 and A2) below that compare directly to Figures 1b and 3 in the main text. However, these figures subset to only those lobbyists with Legistorm-coded race. While the estimation procedure does miss the estimate for some individuals' race, the overall patterns shown with the estimated numbers are still in evidence using only the Legistorm-coded subsample.

Figure A1: Proportion of White Lobbyists – Legistorm Subsample





Figure A2: Proportion of White Lobbyists by Ideology – Legistorm Subsample



Race and Gender by Industry

Figure A3: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry




Figure A4: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry: Health Sector




Figure A5: Proportion of Women Lobbyists by Industry: Ideological / Single-Issue





Figure A6: Proportion of Non-White Lobbyists by Industry



References

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